Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/soulcodex/agenticnpx agentmods add skills/soulcodex/agentic/terraform-infrastructureWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/soulcodex/agentic/terraform-infrastructure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/soulcodex/agentic/terraform-infrastructure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/soulcodex/agentic/terraform-infrastructure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/soulcodex/agentic/terraform-infrastructure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/soulcodex/agentic/terraform-infrastructure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 415 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 427 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 442 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00096 | $0.03501 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.01400 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00700 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00350 |
Grade A, and why
terraform-infrastructure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 465 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Terraform Infrastructure Skill
Always use terraform-risk-playbook first when this skill is active. That
skill is authoritative for the response contract, risk classification,
runtime/version assumptions, validation commands, and rollback notes.
Authoritative precedence: when this skill and other Terraform skills are both active, this skill is authoritative for repo and stack layout, backend topology, CI composition, and multi-region deployment structure.
Step 1 — Module Structure
Organise Terraform code into reusable modules:
infra/
modules/
vpc/
main.tf
variables.tf
outputs.tf
rds/
main.tf
variables.tf
outputs.tf
ecs-service/
main.tf
variables.tf
outputs.tf
environments/
staging/
main.tf ← calls modules, sets env-specific vars
terraform.tfvars ← non-secret values only
backend.tf ← remote state config
production/
main.tf
terraform.tfvars
backend.tf
Rules:
- Every module has exactly three files:
main.tf,variables.tf,outputs.tf. - Modules accept inputs via
variables.tfand expose results viaoutputs.tf. - Never put environment-specific config inside a module.
Step 2 — Remote State
Use S3 remote state for AWS. Prefer native S3 lock files on Terraform 1.10+ and fall back to DynamoDB locking only for older runtime compatibility:
# environments/staging/backend.tf
terraform {
backend "s3" {
bucket = "acme-terraform-state"
key = "staging/terraform.tfstate"
region = "us-east-1"
encrypt = true
use_lockfile = true
}
}
State bucket requirements:
- Versioning enabled.
- Server-side encryption enabled (SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS).
- Block all public access.
- Access restricted to CI role and infrastructure team.
If the runtime is older than Terraform 1.10, replace use_lockfile = true with
dynamodb_table = "acme-terraform-locks" and state that compatibility choice
explicitly.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 465 lines · 96 tokens per session scan A a16eb64c615e
terraform-infrastructure is a skill published in the GitHub repository soulcodex/agentic (10 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 96 tokens to every session and 3,501 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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