Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add stefaniuk/loadout --skill gha-security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/stefaniuk/loadoutWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/stefaniuk/loadout/gha-security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/stefaniuk/loadout/gha-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/stefaniuk/loadout/gha-security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/stefaniuk/loadout/gha-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/stefaniuk/loadout/gha-security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00076 | $0.02042 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00038 | $0.01021 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00408 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00204 |
Grade A, and why
gha-security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
98% identical to gha-security-review — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 193 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub Actions Security Review
Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.
This skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI/CD theory.
Scope
Review the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.
Files to Review
.github/workflows/*.yml— all workflow definitionsaction.yml/action.yaml— composite actions in the repo.github/actions/*/action.yml— local reusable actions- Config files loaded by workflows:
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,Makefile, shell scripts under.github/
Out of Scope
- Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)
- GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)
Threat Model
Only report vulnerabilities exploitable by an external attacker — someone without write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger workflow_dispatch, or trigger manual workflows.
Do not flag vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:
workflow_dispatchinput injection — requires write access to trigger- Expression injection in
push-only workflows on protected branches workflow_callinput injection where all callers are internal- Secrets in
workflow_dispatch/schedule-only workflows
Confidence
Report only HIGH and MEDIUM confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.
| Confidence | Criteria | Action |
|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Traced the full attack path, confirmed exploitable | Report with exploitation scenario and fix |
| MEDIUM | Attack path partially confirmed, uncertain link | Report as needs verification |
| LOW | Theoretical or mitigated elsewhere | Do not report |
What ships with it
9 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/ai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md 5.3 KB
- references/comment-triggered-commands.md 5.5 KB
- references/credential-escalation.md 6.5 KB
- references/expression-injection.md 8.4 KB
- references/permissions-and-secrets.md 7.7 KB
- references/pwn-request.md 5.8 KB
- references/real-world-attacks.md 9.2 KB
- references/runner-infrastructure.md 7.8 KB
- references/supply-chain.md 9.4 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 193 lines · 76 tokens per session scan A 441f8ada45bd
gha-security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository stefaniuk/loadout (1 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 76 tokens to every session and 2,042 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 98% identical to gha-security-review, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
artifact-conventions
Defines preservation, format, and section rules for SDD specification artifacts (spec.md, plan.md, tasks.md, checklists). Use when editing feature-artifact files under specs/ / to prevent accidental corruption of cross-referenced IDs, priorities, and gating state.
plan-authoring
Reference material for writing implementation plans (technical context, architecture decisions, data models, API contracts, project-instructions alignment). Loaded on demand by plan-feature; not directly invokable.
task-generation
Reference material with the canonical task-format grammar and decomposition rules for plan-to-tasks expansion. Loaded on demand by generate-tasks; not directly invokable.
adr-authoring
Defines the canonical MADR format, lifecycle rules, numbering policy, and SAD catalog contract for standalone ADRs under specs/adrs/.
implementation-standards
Reference material with coding standards (defensive coding, error handling, testing patterns). Loaded on demand by the Developer sub-agent (.github/agents/developer.md); not directly invokable.
spec-authoring
Reference material for writing product, technical, and operational specifications (work-item priorities, requirement families, success criteria). Loaded on demand by specify-feature; not directly invokable.