Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to suisya-systems/claude-org-ja. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/main/.claude/skills/org-pull-request/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/suisya-systems/claude-org-jaWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 93 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 93 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 38 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 45 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 78 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 83 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 341 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 382 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 115 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00181 | $0.19891 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00090 | $0.09945 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.03978 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.01989 |
Grade A, and why
org-pull-request scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 425 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
org-pull-request: PR 作成・レビュー・マージ後クローズ
ワーカー完了報告 → ユーザー承認 → push / PR 作成 / CI 監視 / レビュー指摘ループ / PR マージ後の最終クローズまでを担当する。窓口専属。発動の前提は「ワーカーが完了報告済み・ユーザーが明示的承認を出した」状態にあること。承認前段階(ack 発行・REVIEW 遷移・ユーザー報告)は .claude/skills/org-delegate/SKILL.md Step 5 (2a) を参照。
T5 contract: 本スキルが扱う
awaiting_review → complete遷移の正準仕様はdocs/contracts/delegation-lifecycle-contract.md§2 T5 / T6 / §1.5 close-condition。 同 contract は close-condition / pane discipline / 再 spawn 禁止を pin する SoT。 本 SKILL は手順を、contract は不変条件を担当する。
ack ≠ user 承認: 本スキルが発動した時点で ack は既に発行済み(
.claude/skills/org-delegate/SKILL.mdStep 5 step 1 /.claude/skills/org-delegate/references/ack-template.md)。push /gh pr create//pr-watch-paneはユーザー承認後にのみ発行する。
輸送層 両系(
ORG_TRANSPORT: 既定broker/ opt-inrenga): 本スキルのmcp__org-broker__*(worker への修正指示send_message等)は コード既定brokerフレーム(tools/transport.py: DEFAULT_TRANSPORT、移行目標。下記「二フレーム注記」を先に参照)で書いてあり、tool 名はそのまま従えばよい。ただしCI_COMPLETED/PR_MERGED等が broker の push 一次(各ペイン同居の channel sidecarserver:org-broker-channelがnotifications/claude/channelで窓口の idle セッションへ注入。runtime push-first 0.1.24+、設計 SoT は transport-labdocs/design/broker-native-roles.md§9)で届くのはORG_TRANSPORT=brokerを明示した場合であって、pr-watch の peer 通知 helpertools/peer_notify.py: notify_peerは無設定(運用既定)時は renga にフォールバックするため、無設定環境の受信は renga の in-band push になる(下記の二フレーム注記・2b-i 参照)。push 失効時のフォールバックは送信 transport に依存(ORG_TRANSPORT=broker明示時のみ窓口がターン冒頭で能動mcp__org-broker__check_messages、無設定で renga 経路に乗った場合は broker キューに載らないため events テーブルのポーリングで受ける。下記 2b-i の受信モデル注記を参照。§9.6)、エラーは broker 拡張コード(.claude/skills/org-delegate/references/renga-error-codes.mdの broker 節)が加わる。ORG_TRANSPORT=renga(opt-in・切戻し可)では完全修飾名がmcp__org-broker__*→mcp__renga-peers__*に機械置換され、CI_COMPLETED 等は<channel source="renga-peers">の in-band push で届く(手順は同型・renga は削除せず常時有効な切戻しの安全装置)。詳細は CLAUDE.md「輸送層(transport)両系」節とdocs/contracts/backend-interface-contract.mdSurface 8(ratified 2026-06-14。push 一次への additive 改訂 S3 が ratified 済み(2026-06-15)・既存 ratified 本文不変更)を参照。
「既定」の二フレーム注記(Refs #604): 本スキルが
mcp__org-broker__*一次で「既定broker」と書くのはコード既定フレーム(tools/transport.py: DEFAULT_TRANSPORTが runtime 0.1.28 / Epic #586 でbrokerにフリップ済み・移行目標)。運用既定は renga(broker 実走 dogfood は Epic #6 Issue G まで未活性)で、rootCLAUDE.md「輸送層(transport)両系」節と同じ二フレーム関係にある。重要(pr-watch peer 通知の実挙動): pr-watch が CI 完了 / merge / タイムアウト時に Secretary へ送る peer 通知 helpertools/peer_notify.py: notify_peerはDEFAULT_TRANSPORTを参照しない raw env 判定で、ORG_TRANSPORT==brokerを明示した時のみ broker CLI(claude-org-runtime broker send)経路、無設定(運用既定)時は renga /RENGA_SOCKETフォールバック(RENGA_SOCKETも無ければ silent no-op)。したがって運用既定(無設定)環境ではCI_COMPLETED等は renga の in-band<channel source="renga-peers">push で届き、broker channel sidecar の push 一次はORG_TRANSPORT=brokerを明示した時の受信経路である(下記 2b-i は両系を併記する)。
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 425 lines · 181 tokens per session scan A e4a43f815b3c
org-pull-request is a skill published in the GitHub repository suisya-systems/claude-org-ja (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 181 tokens to every session and 19,891 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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