Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to suisya-systems/claude-org-ja. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/main/.claude/skills/org-pull-request/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/suisya-systems/claude-org-jaWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/suisya-systems/claude-org-ja/org-pull-request.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 93 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 93 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 38 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 45 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 78 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 83 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 341 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 382 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 115 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00181 | $0.17057 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00072 | $0.06823 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.03411 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.01706 |
Grade B, and why
org-pull-request scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Enumerates other installed skillsmediumAgent snooping
Other skills' SKILL.md files reveal prompts, capabilities and secrets that should be invisible to peers.
- **パターン C(`gitignored_repo_root`, claude-org 自己編集)の特例 cleanup(Issue #478)**: `worker_dir` が claude-org-ja repo root 自身なので、worktree remove も dir 削除も効かず、`{claude_org_root}/CLAUDE.local.md`(ワーカー指示ブリーフ)が残留する。**close 時に `too How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 377 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
org-pull-request: PR 作成・レビュー・マージ後クローズ
ワーカー完了報告 → ユーザー承認 → push / PR 作成 / CI 監視 / レビュー指摘ループ / PR マージ後の最終クローズまでを担当する。窓口専属。発動の前提は「ワーカーが完了報告済み・ユーザーが明示的承認を出した」状態にあること。承認前段階(ack 発行・REVIEW 遷移・ユーザー報告)は .claude/skills/org-delegate/SKILL.md Step 5 (2a) を参照。
T5 contract: 本スキルが扱う
awaiting_review → complete遷移の正準仕様はdocs/contracts/delegation-lifecycle-contract.md§2 T5 / T6 / §1.5 close-condition。 同 contract は close-condition / pane discipline / 再 spawn 禁止を pin する SoT。 本 SKILL は手順を、contract は不変条件を担当する。
ack ≠ user 承認: 本スキルが発動した時点で ack は既に発行済み(
.claude/skills/org-delegate/SKILL.mdStep 5 step 1 /.claude/skills/org-delegate/references/ack-template.md)。push /gh pr create//pr-watch-paneはユーザー承認後にのみ発行する。
輸送層(transport)両系: 本スキルのツール参照は
mcp__org-broker__*(org-broker)で書いてあり、active transport が既定面ならそのまま従えばよい。輸送層で手順が変わるのは 受信モデル / spawn 儀式 / エラー分岐 の 3 点だけ。うち本スキルで実際に効くのは受信モデル 1 点で、CI_COMPLETED/PR_MERGEDの判定は輸送層に依らず events テーブルの canonical 行が正本(直 push は best-effort 補助。分岐の本体は下記 2b-i の受信モデルと「CI 完了検知の正路」節)。両系の読み替え規則・「既定」の二フレーム注記・契約の批准経緯・broker 拡張エラーコードは.claude/skills/org-pull-request/references/transport-duality.mdを参照(上記 3 分岐に入るまで読む必要はない)。
2a-p. ワーカーから「sandbox 外での rebase を依頼」の報告を受けたとき(承認前、Issue #1217)
ワーカーは rebase の前に tools/rebase_preflight.sh <base_ref> を回し、上流が sandbox で書けないパス(.claude/skills 等)を変えている(REBASE_PREFLIGHT: blocked)ときは rebase せずにこれを頼んでくる。そのまま rebase させると could not detach HEAD で止まり、作業ツリーに上流の中身が残るため。ack の後、窓口が自分の Bash(ワーカー sandbox の外)で次を行う。
git -C <worker_dir> status --porcelain --untracked-files=noが空であることを確かめる。空でなければワーカーの未コミット作業なので rebase せず、ワーカーに commit してから頼み直すよう送るgit -C <worker_dir> rebase <base_ref>(<base_ref>はsend_plan.jsonのsummary.base_ref)。conflict が出たらgit -C <worker_dir> rebase --abortで戻し、.claude/skills/org-escalation/SKILL.mdの手順で人間に上げる(窓口は conflict を解かない)- ワーカーに「sandbox 外で rebase した(HEAD=
<sha>)。git rev-list --count HEAD..<base_ref>が 0 でgit statusが空であることを確かめ、通常検証と Codex ゲートを回し直して完了報告して」と送る
What ships with it
5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago Changed · +9 lines bbc8ba4b044e
- 12d ago Changed · +22 lines e7cffaa94ad6
- 1mo ago Changed 00b76c9bf3e5
- 1mo ago Changed · -79 lines scan A → B 7415ab4f96ad
- 2mo ago First seen · 425 lines · 181 tokens per session scan A e4a43f815b3c
org-pull-request is a skill published in the GitHub repository suisya-systems/claude-org-ja (5 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 181 tokens to every session and 17,057 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (enumerates other installed skills). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
github
Skill "github" from Hmbown/Codewhale, covering github, when to use, setup, workflow and non-goals.
ai-driven-code-editor-cli
OpenCode AI - AI-driven code editor/IDE (CLI/TUI version of Cursor/Windsurf). Use when: (1) AI-assisted coding tasks, (2) Code refactoring with AI, (3) GitHub PR review/fixes, (4) Multi-file edits requiring context, (5) Running AI agents on codebases. NOT for: simple one-line ed…
dos-verify-done-claims
Before accepting an agent's 'done / shipped / fixed' claim, verify it against ground truth (git ancestry + the commit's own diff) using the DOS kernel's dos verify and dos commit-audit — never the agent's own narration.
b3os-release-ops
A release and deployment checklist for the b3os project. It covers merging code, live releases, urgent fixes, and changes to public Git history.
tmb_push-gate
Bro's push-gate orchestration — reaping unsigned commits, spawning code-reviewer per task, and the all-pass push + PR-create + post-merge cleanup path. Loaded by bro when the push hook blocks or the Human asks for review-before-push.
subagent-reports-complete-but-pr-unmerged
Catch the systematic gap between sub-agent "completed" status and the actual end state of a PR-merge orchestration task. Use when: (1) you've dispatched multiple parallel sub-agents (general-purpose or specialist) to open + review + merge PRs, (2) the parent receives with status: completed but the sub-agent's last…