Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add TalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skills --skill app-store-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/TalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/app-store-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/app-store-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/app-store-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/app-store-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/app-store-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 95 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 97 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 128 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 154 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 190 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 255 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 95 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00219 | $0.04923 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00088 | $0.01969 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00044 | $0.00985 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00492 |
Grade A, and why
app-store-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 261 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
App Store Review (iOS 26)
Pre-submission audit for a fintech iOS app: guideline exposure, the privacy
manifest, privacy labels, ATT, payment rules, export compliance, and the App
Store Connect metadata gate. Grounded in the App Review Guidelines and Apple's
PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy / App Store Connect documentation.
- Not covered here: how to implement IAP (
storekit), Apple Pay (passkit), Sign in with Apple / passkeys (authentication), Keychain/CryptoKit/ATS (swift-security), Wallet financial data (financekit). This skill audits their reviewability. - Android counterpart:
play-policy-insights(Data safety form, permissions, policy).
Contents
- How to use / triage model
- Guideline domains & top fintech triggers
- PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy
- App Privacy nutrition labels
- App Tracking Transparency
- StoreKit / payment-rule compliance
- Export compliance
- Entitlements & capabilities
- Metadata / screenshots / age rating
- TestFlight
- Upload blockers vs post-review cleanup
- Correctness checklist
- References:
references/privacy-manifest.md,references/rejection-playbook.md
How to use / triage model
Sort every finding into one of three buckets — they fail at different gates:
- Upload blockers — the binary or App Store Connect record is rejected at upload/validation time, before a human looks. Automated. Fix these first (see blockers).
- Metadata gate — App Store Connect refuses to submit until required fields are set (privacy labels, age rating, export compliance answer, encryption docs, screenshots for required sizes).
- Post-review cleanup — passes upload but risks human rejection under a guideline. Ranked by likelihood, not certainty. Document your reasoning so a resubmission note can pre-empt it.
Audit order: run through Guidelines for exposure → verify the privacy manifest exists and matches actual API/SDK use → reconcile it against the privacy labels → confirm ATT/payment/export/entitlement gates → check metadata completeness.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 261 lines · 219 tokens per session scan A 9f548f6ff52e
app-store-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository TalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skills (16 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 219 tokens to every session and 4,923 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
app-store-review compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| app-store-reviewTalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skills | Skill | 16 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 219 | Claude Code, Codex |
| compose-multiplatformericrisco/rsc-harness | Skill | 503 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 80 | Claude Code, Codex |
| cmp-firebase-connectkvdm-co-pilot/create-cmp | Skill | 0 | 16d ago | MIT | A | 195 | Claude Code |
| cmp-auditkvdm-co-pilot/create-cmp | Skill | 0 | 16d ago | MIT | A | 157 | Claude Code |
| add-featurekvdm-co-pilot/create-cmp | Skill | 0 | 16d ago | MIT | A | 169 | Claude Code |
| add-screenkvdm-co-pilot/create-cmp | Skill | 0 | 16d ago | MIT | A | 202 | Claude Code |
| add-repositorykvdm-co-pilot/create-cmp | Skill | 0 | 16d ago | MIT | A | 181 | Claude Code |