Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add TalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skills --skill device-integritygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/TalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/device-integrity)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/device-integrity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/device-integrity/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/device-integrity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/talissonvitorino/kmp-ios-skills/device-integrity.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 80 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 94 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 132 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 158 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 181 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 182 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 183 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 184 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00213 | $0.04106 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00106 | $0.02053 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00821 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00411 |
Grade A, and why
device-integrity scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 227 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Device Integrity & Anti-Fraud (iOS)
Prove a request comes from a genuine, unmodified build of your app on a real Apple device — not a script, emulator, repackaged clone, or instrumented copy. Two Apple frameworks, different jobs:
- App Attest (
DCAppAttestService) — cryptographic proof of app + device authenticity per request. A hardware key in the Secure Enclave signs your payloads; your server verifies. Use to gate money-moving and abuse-prone endpoints. - DeviceCheck (
DCDevice) — two persistent bits per device per developer, surviving reinstalls and factory resets. Use for coarse device-level flags (trial abused, promo redeemed, banned).
Neither is authentication or authorization — they answer "is this a legitimate client instance?",
not "who is the user?". Combine with real auth (authentication) and never treat client-side
results as trusted; all verdicts are made on your server.
- Companion primitives: Keychain, Secure Enclave, CryptoKit, and TLS/SPKI pinning live in
swift-security. - Sign-in (Apple/passkeys/OAuth):
authentication. Android counterpart: Play Integrity + root/emulator detection inandroid-device-integrity. - KMP boundary: expose a
commonMaininterface DeviceIntegrityand bind aniosMainactual; seeexpect-actual. Keep raw attestation objects out of shared code — pass opaque base64 through to your backend.
Contents
- Choosing App Attest vs DeviceCheck
- Prerequisites
- App Attest — client flow
- App Attest — server verification
- Assertions — protecting an endpoint
- Receipts & the fraud risk metric
- DeviceCheck — two-bit device state
- Anti-fraud design
- Error handling
- Correctness checklist
- References:
references/server-verification.md,references/devicecheck-server.md
Choosing App Attest vs DeviceCheck
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 227 lines · 213 tokens per session scan A d69939c5881c
device-integrity is a skill published in the GitHub repository TalissonVitorino/kmp-ios-skills (12 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 213 tokens to every session and 4,106 once invoked, about $0.0011 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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