daemon-setup

daemon-setup is a skill for Claude Code from terrylica/cc-skills. It costs 47 tokens per session (1,615 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

An interactive setup wizard for a background asciinema recording daemon on macOS. A daemon is a process that keeps running independently of your coding session, using stored GitHub credentials and optional Pushover notifications.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to create credentials, configure notifications, store secrets in macOS Keychain, install the daemon with launchd, and verify its setup.
Why use it?
It keeps recording-related background work running after a terminal closes and provides logs and notifications for failures. It also separates the daemon's credentials from shared GitHub authentication.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: allowed-tools in frontmatter. Also seen: names the AskUserQuestion tool; mentions Claude Code.

Part of the asciinema-tools plugin — 24 skills shipped together , and of cc-skills

Good fit Use it to create credentials, configure notifications, store secrets in macOS Keychain, install the daemon with launchd, and verify its setup.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add terrylica/cc-skills --skill daemon-setup
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/terrylica/cc-skills

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install asciinema-tools, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 24 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for daemon-setup

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for daemon-setup

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terrylica/cc-skills/daemon-setup.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 47 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,615 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 18 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Privilege Escalation · line 48
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 50
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 98
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 114
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 151
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 32
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 135
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 137
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 84
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 87
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 88
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 93
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 107
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 84
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 114
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 137
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 153
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 153
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00047 $0.01615
Opus 5.5 $0.00019 $0.00646
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00009 $0.00323
Haiku 4.5 $0.00005 $0.00161

Measured 27d ago against content hash 7afac933d79d, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

daemon-setup scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 27d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

for tool in asciinema zstd git curl jq; do
plugins/asciinema-tools/skills/daemon-setup/SKILL.md · 180 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 180 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

/asciinema-tools:daemon-setup

Interactive wizard to set up the asciinema chunker daemon. This daemon runs independently of Claude Code, using dedicated credentials stored in macOS Keychain.

Self-Evolving Skill: This skill improves through use. If instructions are wrong, parameters drifted, or a workaround was needed — fix this file immediately, don't defer. Only update for real, reproducible issues.

Why a Daemon?

Problem with old approach Daemon solution
Uses gh auth token (shared) Uses dedicated PAT from Keychain
Dies when terminal closes launchd keeps it running
Silent push failures Logs + Pushover notifications
Tied to Claude Code session Completely decoupled

Setup Phases Overview

Phase Name Details
1 Preflight Check Below
2 Check Existing Below
3 GitHub PAT Setup PAT Setup Guide
4 Pushover Setup Pushover Setup Guide
5-6 Config + Install launchd Installation Guide
7 Verify + Troubleshoot Verification & Troubleshooting

Execution

Phase 1: Preflight Check

Check required tools:

/usr/bin/env bash << 'PREFLIGHT_EOF'
MISSING=()
for tool in asciinema zstd git curl jq; do
  command -v "$tool" &>/dev/null || MISSING+=("$tool")
done

# macOS-specific: security command for Keychain
if [[ "$(uname)" == "Darwin" ]]; then
  command -v security &>/dev/null || MISSING+=("security (macOS Keychain)")
fi

if [[ ${#MISSING[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
  echo "MISSING:${MISSING[*]}"
  exit 1
fi

echo "PREFLIGHT:OK"
PREFLIGHT_EOF

Read the full file on GitHub · 180 lines

Files

What ships with it

5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 27d ago Changed · +16 tokens per session 7afac933d79d
  2. 1mo ago First seen · 180 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A c705616dc14b

Subscribe to this mod's changes

daemon-setup is a skill published in the GitHub repository terrylica/cc-skills (0 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 1,615 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.