Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add the-cyber-boardroom/SGraph-AI__App__Send --skill create-vault-appsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/the-cyber-boardroom/SGraph-AI__App__SendWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/the-cyber-boardroom/sgraph-ai__app__send/create-vault-apps)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/the-cyber-boardroom/sgraph-ai__app__send/create-vault-apps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/the-cyber-boardroom/sgraph-ai__app__send/create-vault-apps/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/the-cyber-boardroom/sgraph-ai__app__send/create-vault-apps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/the-cyber-boardroom/sgraph-ai__app__send/create-vault-apps.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 412 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 8 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 28 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 309 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 429 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 108 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00213 | $0.09281 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00106 | $0.04640 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00043 | $0.01856 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00928 |
Grade A, and why
vault-html-app scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 440 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Building HTML Apps That Live Inside an SG/Vault
Canonical source:
library/skills/create-vault-apps/SKILL.mdin theSGraph-AI__App__Sendrepo. Last verified: 2026-08-03 against app-shell v0.2.3 and sgit-ai v0.14.27. If your copy of this skill came from anywhere else (a vault, a manual upload), check the repo for a newer version before trusting details.
A vault app is a single index.html (plus its data and assets) that lives inside an SG/Send vault and renders straight from it. When the vault opens, the app launches: full-screen, talking to the vault through a bridge, with the encrypted blob serving as both the storage and the distribution mechanism. The medium is the message — sharing the vault link is sharing the app.
This skill captures the techniques that work, the contract you must follow, and the traps to avoid. It is written from real experience building three production apps (a photo gallery, an event report, a strategy microsite) inside the dev vault server, with one full revision cycle each — the patterns here have all been bug-fixed against actual vault behaviour, not just inferred from docs.
Canonical references
This file is the agent-facing how-to — patterns, traps, sample skeletons. For the
authoritative platform reference, two docs are kept in lockstep with the
app-shell/app-hud source code:
library/guides/vault-html/AUTHORING.md— the fullwindow.sg.*runtime API, every namespace (vfs,fs,vault,history,sync,auth,ui,state,llm,loadCss/loadJs,app), what the host does automatically (nav, hash anchors, external links, friendly 404, print, consent overlays), and theapp.jsonhud.{mode, show.*}config schema for the chrome.library/skills/use-sg-playwright/SKILL.md— how to drivesg-playwrightfrom a Claude session to screenshot a live vault app (no local Chromium required).
Cross-check AUTHORING.md before you write any sg.* call from this skill. Some
samples in this file pre-date 2026-05-30 — when in doubt, the AUTHORING.md is the
ground truth.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed · +8 lines 54c61a2471db
- 10d ago First seen · 432 lines · 213 tokens per session scan A f6ae6c8c266b
vault-html-app is a skill published in the GitHub repository the-cyber-boardroom/SGraph-AI__App__Send (11 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 213 tokens to every session and 9,281 once invoked, about $0.0011 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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