Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to TheDecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kit. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TheDecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kit/main/.claude/skills/docker-swarm/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/TheDecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/thedecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kit/docker-swarm)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/thedecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kit/docker-swarm"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/thedecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kit/docker-swarm.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00110 | $0.01692 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00055 | $0.00846 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00338 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00169 |
Grade A, and why
docker-swarm scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 105 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Docker Swarm: Single Node to Multi-Node
Compose and Swarm read the same file and interpret it differently. The trap is that Swarm fails silently: the stack deploys, containers start, and something just doesn't work the way it did locally. Write the compose file for the multi-node world from day one and the single-node case still works.
The mental model: a container is a process, not a computer
Swarm tears down and recreates containers constantly, on every update, node failure, scale, and rebalance. The new container has a new ID, a new IP, a new hostname, and a blank filesystem. Treat the container as disposable and keep all state outside it: a database or Redis for sessions, a named volume or object storage for files, env or Docker secrets/configs for configuration, stdout/stderr for logs. The test: if Swarm kills this container right now and starts a new one, does the app work identically? If not, state is leaking into the container.
Directives Swarm silently ignores
docker stack deploy reads these and skips them with no error. If you relied on one locally, you debug for hours before realizing Swarm never read it.
build (Swarm only runs pre-built registry images), container_name (names collide with replicas), depends_on (no startup ordering, services start in parallel), links, restart (use deploy.restart_policy), networks.ipv4_address / ipv6_address, network_mode, cap_add / cap_drop, devices, tmpfs, extra_hosts, sysctls, security_opt, cgroup_parent, userns_mode. Capabilities, sysctls, and security options are set at the engine level on each node instead.
Directives that change behavior in Swarm
portspublish through the routing mesh: the port opens on every node, and traffic to any node is routed to a container wherever it runs. Publish the container port only (- "61339") and let the mesh assign a host port, your reverse proxy reaches the service by name and never needs to know the host port.volumes: named volumes work everywhere; bind mounts to host paths break the moment a container is scheduled on a different node, because that path doesn't exist there. Use named volumes for data and Docker configs/secrets for files.networks: Compose defaults tobridge(single host). Swarm needsoverlay(multi-host). A bridge network in a stack means services can't talk across nodes.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 105 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 6676cf74d890
docker-swarm is a skill published in the GitHub repository TheDecipherist/claude-code-mastery-project-starter-kit (337 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 110 tokens to every session and 1,692 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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