Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add timurgaleev/vibestack --skill land-and-deploygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/timurgaleev/vibestackWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/timurgaleev/vibestack/land-and-deploy)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/timurgaleev/vibestack/land-and-deploy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/timurgaleev/vibestack/land-and-deploy/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/timurgaleev/vibestack/land-and-deploy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/timurgaleev/vibestack/land-and-deploy.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 567 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Tool Misuse · line 831 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 632 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 8 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 105 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 392 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 492 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 850 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 888 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1036 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 967 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1068 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1047 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 1139 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1191 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.30059 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.12024 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.06012 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.03006 |
Grade A, and why
land-and-deploy scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
# curl -sf {production-url} -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" 2>/dev/null How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,922 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
If this session was compacted, the copy of this skill in context may be cut off.
Read ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/SKILL.md from disk and resume at the step you are on.
When to invoke
When the user types /land-and-deploy, or explicitly asks the agent to land and deploy a
specific PR. A merge to production is a one-way door: a passing mention of "merge", "land"
or "deploy" in conversation is not such a request — ask before running it.
Preamble
eval "$("${VIBESTACK_HOME:-$HOME/.vibestack}/bin/vibe-slug" 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || SLUG="unknown"
_LEARN_FILE="${VIBESTACK_HOME:-$HOME/.vibestack}/projects/${SLUG:-unknown}/learnings.jsonl"
if [ -f "$_LEARN_FILE" ]; then
_LEARN_COUNT=$(wc -l < "$_LEARN_FILE" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
echo "LEARNINGS: $_LEARN_COUNT entries loaded"
if [ "$_LEARN_COUNT" -gt 5 ] 2>/dev/null; then
"${VIBESTACK_HOME:-$HOME/.vibestack}/bin/vibe-learnings-search" --limit 5 2>/dev/null || true
fi
else
echo "LEARNINGS: none yet"
fi
{{include lib/snippets/session-host.md}}
{{include lib/snippets/decision-brief.md}}
{{include lib/snippets/working-protocols.md}}
{{include lib/snippets/state-protocols.md}}
SETUP
{{include lib/snippets/browse-detect.md}}
Third-party web actions
Deploys run into vendor dashboards — a platform console, a DNS record, a settings toggle no CLI exposes. Never hand the user a numbered list of clicks to perform on a third-party site without first offering to drive it yourself.
- If
$Bis available, offer to drive the page with it. Pages behind a login need the user's own session, which/connect-chromeor/setup-browser-cookiesimports. Ask first — those cookies are their credentials, and their presence on this machine is not consent to use them. - If the step genuinely needs a human (an OAuth prompt, an MFA challenge, a payment form), open the page, say exactly what to do on it, and wait. Resume from where the deploy stopped rather than restarting the workflow.
- If the browse shim is absent, the manual list is the fallback, not the opening move. Do not install a browser or a platform CLI on the user's behalf to make the automated path work; offer, and let them decide.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday Changed 4eceda3b8a7b
- 5d ago Changed · +21 lines 611803810ea0
- 6d ago Changed · +73 lines 8b9058035b95
- 1mo ago Changed · +59 lines · -11 tokens per session 8fd58db6ad84
- 1mo ago Changed · +520 lines d648fb413a6b
- 2mo ago Changed · +113 lines 2e37ba945a36
- 2mo ago First seen · 1,136 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A 00328d2ce845
land-and-deploy is a skill published in the GitHub repository timurgaleev/vibestack (8 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 30,059 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
land-and-deploy compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| land-and-deploytimurgaleev/vibestack | Skill | 8 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 27 | Claude Code |
| artifact-deploykirodotdev/KiroCrew | Skill | 4.9k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 74 | Claude Code, Codex |
| explain-forkirodotdev/KiroCrew | Skill | 4.9k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 71 | Claude Code, Codex |
| web-verifykirodotdev/KiroCrew | Skill | 4.9k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 0 | Claude Code, Codex |
| learn-from-sagekirodotdev/KiroCrew | Skill | 4.9k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 56 | Claude Code, Codex |
| mochi-remindkirodotdev/KiroCrew | Skill | 4.9k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 20 | Claude Code, Codex |
| web-previewkirodotdev/KiroCrew | Skill | 4.9k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 68 | Claude Code, Codex |