Cognee is an AI memory platform that stores information in a self-hosted knowledge graph so agents can retain context across sessions. It ingests data, connects related information, and helps agents retrieve it for reasoning and actions. The catalogue includes skills and instructions that extend agent workflows around Cognee.
Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to topoteretes/cognee. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/topoteretes/cognee/main/.agents/skills/cognee-permissions/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/topoteretes/cogneeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/topoteretes/cognee/cognee-permissions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/topoteretes/cognee/cognee-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/topoteretes/cognee/cognee-permissions/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/topoteretes/cognee/cognee-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/topoteretes/cognee/cognee-permissions.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 146 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 147 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 148 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 25 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00084 | $0.03546 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.01418 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00709 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00355 |
Grade A, and why
cognee-permissions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 287 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Users, permissions, and multi-tenancy
Every dataset belongs to an owner, and every operation on it is checked
against a grant: a principal (user, role, or tenant) holding a
permission (read, write, delete, share) on a dataset. With access
control on (the default), each user+dataset pair also gets its own graph and
vector databases.
Use it
Act as a user in the SDK
Without user=, SDK calls run as the default user
([email protected], or DEFAULT_USER_EMAIL). To act as someone
else, create or load them and pass user=:
import cognee
from cognee.modules.users.methods import create_user, get_user
alice = await create_user("[email protected]", "password")
bob = await create_user("[email protected]", "password")
res = await cognee.remember("Alice's notes", dataset_name="alice_notes", user=alice)
await cognee.recall("What are the notes about?", user=alice, datasets=["alice_notes"])
remember, recall, search, forget, improve and the dataset helpers
all take user=.
Share a dataset
The caller must hold share on the dataset. Share by dataset id:
from uuid import UUID
from cognee.modules.users.permissions.methods import (
authorized_give_permission_on_datasets,
authorized_revoke_permission_on_datasets,
)
await authorized_give_permission_on_datasets(
bob.id, # principal: a user, role, or tenant id
[UUID(res.dataset_id)], # dataset ids (RememberResult.dataset_id is a str)
"read", # "read" | "write" | "delete" | "share"
alice.id, # the owner making the grant
)
await cognee.recall("...", user=bob, dataset_ids=[UUID(res.dataset_id)]) # by id (must be a UUID)
Bob must address Alice's dataset by id: dataset names resolve only among the caller's own datasets.
Tenants and roles (organizations and groups)
from cognee.modules.users.tenants.methods import add_user_to_tenant, create_tenant, select_tenant
from cognee.modules.users.roles.methods import add_user_to_role, create_role
tenant_id = await create_tenant("Acme", alice.id) # alice owns it
await select_tenant(user_id=alice.id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
role_id = await create_role(role_name="Researcher", owner_id=alice.id)
await add_user_to_tenant(user_id=bob.id, tenant_id=tenant_id, owner_id=alice.id)
await add_user_to_role(user_id=bob.id, role_id=role_id, owner_id=alice.id)
await select_tenant(user_id=bob.id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
alice = await get_user(alice.id) # reload after changing the active tenant
res = await cognee.remember(text, dataset_name="acme_docs", user=alice)
await authorized_give_permission_on_datasets(role_id, [UUID(res.dataset_id)], "read", alice.id)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +28 lines b845e039fd1e
- 1mo ago Changed · +93 lines · +22 tokens per session 0804da1fa2c1
- 1mo ago Changed 769d0b5af578
- 2mo ago First seen · 166 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A a3be7a043a83
cognee-permissions is a skill published in the GitHub repository topoteretes/cognee (33,094 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 84 tokens to every session and 3,546 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
cognee-permissions compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cognee-permissionstopoteretes/cognee | Skill | 33k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 84 | Claude Code, Codex |
| openmemoryCaviraOSS/OpenMemory | Skill | 4.6k | 19d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 96 | Claude Code, Codex |
| memseek-remembermemseekai/memseek | Skill | 11 | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 24 | Claude Code |
| memseek-explainmemseekai/memseek | Skill | 11 | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 25 | Claude Code |
| memseek-searchmemseekai/memseek | Skill | 11 | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 22 | Claude Code |
| reflex-createterrizoaguimor/celiums-memory | Skill | 23 | 2mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 72 | Claude Code |
| surface-learningsterrizoaguimor/celiums-memory | Skill | 23 | 2mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 60 | Claude Code |