Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add travisjneuman/.claude --skill application-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/travisjneuman/.claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/travisjneuman/.claude/application-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/travisjneuman/.claude/application-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/travisjneuman/.claude/application-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/travisjneuman/.claude/application-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/travisjneuman/.claude/application-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Output Handling · line 73 Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.Fix: Validate and sanitize all model output before using it in downstream contexts. Use parameterized queries for SQL, shell quoting for commands, and HTML encoding for web output.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 208 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.01368 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00547 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00274 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
application-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 213 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Application Security Skill
Secure coding patterns, vulnerability prevention, and security tooling for web applications.
OWASP Top 10 (2021) with Code Examples
A01: Broken Access Control
// BAD - No authorization check
app.get('/api/users/:id', async (req, res) => {
const user = await db.user.findUnique({ where: { id: req.params.id } });
res.json(user);
});
// GOOD - Verify ownership or role
app.get('/api/users/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
if (req.user.id !== req.params.id && req.user.role !== 'ADMIN') {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Forbidden' });
}
const user = await db.user.findUnique({ where: { id: req.params.id } });
res.json(user);
});
A02: Cryptographic Failures
// BAD - Weak hashing
import crypto from 'crypto';
const hash = crypto.createHash('md5').update(password).digest('hex');
// GOOD - Use bcrypt with proper rounds
import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
const hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 12);
const isValid = await bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
A03: Injection
// BAD - SQL injection
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`;
// GOOD - Parameterized queries (Prisma handles this automatically)
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email } });
// GOOD - Parameterized raw SQL when needed
const users = await prisma.$queryRaw`SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ${email}`;
A07: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
// BAD - Rendering raw HTML
element.innerHTML = userInput;
// GOOD - Use textContent or framework escaping
element.textContent = userInput;
// GOOD - React auto-escapes by default
return <div>{userInput}</div>;
// BAD in React - dangerouslySetInnerHTML
return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userInput }} />;
Content Security Policy (CSP)
Recommended Headers
// Next.js middleware
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
export function middleware(request: Request) {
const nonce = crypto.randomUUID();
const csp = [
`default-src 'self'`,
`script-src 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}'`,
`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`,
`img-src 'self' data: https:`,
`font-src 'self'`,
`connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com`,
`frame-ancestors 'none'`,
`base-uri 'self'`,
`form-action 'self'`,
].join('; ');
const response = NextResponse.next();
response.headers.set('Content-Security-Policy', csp);
response.headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
response.headers.set('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
response.headers.set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
response.headers.set('Permissions-Policy', 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()');
return response;
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 213 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A dabf2942141b
application-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository travisjneuman/.claude (108 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 1,368 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
application-security compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| application-securitytravisjneuman/.claude | Skill | 108 | yesterday | MIT | A | 46 | Claude Code |
| imagegenopenai/codex | Skill | 135k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 113 | Codex |
| playwright-climicrosoft/playwright | Skill | 100k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| browser-automationopenclaw/openclaw | Skill | 394k | today | MIT | A | 36 | Claude Code |
| local-ai-agentsmicrosoft/ai-agents-for-beginners | Skill | 79k | 4d ago | MIT | A | 200 | Claude Code, Codex |
| systematic-debuggingobra/superpowers | Skill | 316k | 7d ago | MIT | A | 21 | Claude Code |
| next-cache-components-adoptionvercel/next.js | Skill | 143k | today | MIT | A | 95 | Claude Code |