Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-pluginnpx agentmods add skills/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin/status-pedidoWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin/status-pedido)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin/status-pedido"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin/status-pedido/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin/status-pedido"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin/status-pedido.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 16 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 15 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 88 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 124 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 436 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 530 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 379 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 452 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 40 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 158 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 207 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 276 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 350 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 407 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 249 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 328 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 441 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00155 | $0.14811 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00077 | $0.07405 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00031 | $0.02962 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.01481 |
Grade A, and why
tray-status-pedido scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Exemplo (curl):** How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 921 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MANDATORY: Tool Calls Required Before Answering
Estas chamadas são OBRIGATÓRIAS, não opcionais. Execute-as antes de gerar qualquer código ou payload. Se você está respondendo sem ter chamado a ferramenta abaixo, pare e chame agora.
1. Buscar documentação atualizada (sempre)
node skills/tray-dev/scripts/search_docs.mjs --topic=status-pedido "<termo da pergunta>"
<TOPIC_SLUG>: ver tabela emskills/tray-dev/SKILL.md.- Use os trechos retornados como fonte primária; este SKILL.md é resumo denso.
2. Revisar campos (este recurso ainda NÃO tem validate.mjs)
Nota: o recurso
status-pedidoainda não possuiscripts/validate.mjslocal. A chamada OBRIGATÓRIA asearch_docs.mjsacima continua valendo. Como não há validador automático, você é responsável por revisar manualmente cada campo obrigatório contra a doc retornada porsearch_docs.mjse contra os schemas de referência emskills/status-pedido/schemas/antes de retornar qualquer código. Confira em especial: chave de recursoOrderStatuspresente no body,namepreenchido,typedentro do enum (open/closed/cancelled) e cores em hexadecimal completo#RRGGBB.
Antes de responder
Execute estas verificações antes de gerar qualquer payload ou código:
- Confirme o método HTTP e o endpoint correto para a operação solicitada
(CRUD em
/orders/statuses). Confirme também que o pedido é sobre o CATÁLOGO de status, e não sobre mudar o status de um pedido individual (esse caso étray-pedidos,PUT /orders/:id). - Identifique os campos obrigatórios listados neste documento —
namenunca pode faltar na criação; não omita nenhum. - Verifique que
access_tokennão aparece como literal string no código gerado — use sempreTRAY_ACCESS_TOKENeTRAY_API_ADDRESSpor variável de ambiente, passado como query param. - Confirme que esta é a skill correta para o recurso (leia
when_not_to_useno frontmatter); status padrão da plataforma não podem ser editados nem excluídos.
What ships with it
13 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- examples/status-pedido-atualizar.curl.sh 854 B runs code
- examples/status-pedido-atualizar.fixture.json 196 B
- examples/status-pedido-atualizar.node.mjs 1.3 KB runs code
- examples/status-pedido-consultar.curl.sh 653 B runs code
- examples/status-pedido-consultar.node.mjs 944 B runs code
- examples/status-pedido-criar.curl.sh 757 B runs code
- examples/status-pedido-criar.fixture.json 196 B
- examples/status-pedido-criar.node.mjs 1.2 KB runs code
- examples/status-pedido-excluir.curl.sh 969 B runs code
- examples/status-pedido-excluir.node.mjs 1.2 KB runs code
- examples/status-pedido-listar.curl.sh 544 B runs code
- examples/status-pedido-listar.node.mjs 811 B runs code
- schemas/order_status.update.json 1.1 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 921 lines · 155 tokens per session scan A 5fa03d054e53
tray-status-pedido is a skill published in the GitHub repository tray-tecnologia/tray-api-ai-plugin (15 stars, last pushed 29d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 155 tokens to every session and 14,811 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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