Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/trilwu/secskills/analyzing-linux-persistencenpx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill analyzing-linux-persistencegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/analyzing-linux-persistence)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/analyzing-linux-persistence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/analyzing-linux-persistence.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00097 | $0.04183 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.02091 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00837 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00418 |
Grade E, and why
analyzing-linux-persistence scanned grade E with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
running `curl | bash` will not trigger a signature. Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
running `curl | bash` will not trigger a signature. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 397 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Analyzing Linux Persistence
Linux persistence mechanisms are spread across dozens of locations that no single tool checks comprehensively. The attacker needs only one you miss. The work is a systematic sweep of every initialization path the kernel and userspace honor, in a sequence that catches the common before the exotic.
When to Use
- Investigating a compromised Linux host to find how the attacker kept access
- Forensic analysis of a Linux disk image or live system
- Looking for backdoors, unauthorized services, or rogue scheduled tasks
- Determining the full scope of attacker modifications during IR
- Validating that eradication removed every persistence mechanism
When NOT to Use
- Running a full incident response -- use
responding-to-incidents - Establishing persistence offensively -- use
establishing-persistence - Actively escalating privileges -- use
escalating-linux-privileges - The host is Windows -- use
investigating-windows-endpoints - You have an acquired disk image, not a live host -- use
analyzing-disk-images - Analyzing a recovered malware sample -- use
analyzing-malware
Systemd Units
Systemd is the most common persistence vector on modern Linux. Check every
search path, not just /etc/systemd/system.
Search paths (evaluated in priority order):
/etc/systemd/system/ # admin-installed, highest priority
/run/systemd/system/ # runtime units, survive until reboot
/usr/lib/systemd/system/ # package-installed defaults
/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/
~/.config/systemd/user/ # per-user units (no root needed)
Enumeration:
# All enabled units -- compare against a known-good baseline
systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled --type=service
systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled --type=timer
# Recently modified service files
find /etc/systemd /run/systemd /usr/lib/systemd ~/.config/systemd \
-name '*.service' -o -name '*.timer' -o -name '*.socket' \
2>/dev/null | xargs ls -lt | head -30
# Show the full contents of a suspect unit
systemctl cat suspicious.service
# Check for drop-in overrides that modify legitimate units
find /etc/systemd/system/*.d /run/systemd/system/*.d \
-name '*.conf' 2>/dev/null
# Masked units -- attacker may mask a security service
systemctl list-unit-files --state=masked
# Systemd generators -- scripts that dynamically create units at boot.
# Four directories, in ascending precedence. Checking only the first two
# misses generators dropped in the others.
ls -la /etc/systemd/system-generators/
ls -la /run/systemd/system-generators/ # tmpfs: runtime-injected
ls -la /usr/local/lib/systemd/system-generators/
ls -la /usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 397 lines · 97 tokens per session scan E 82724e3e28fd
analyzing-linux-persistence is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (134 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 4,183 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it E with 3 findings (reaches for credential files, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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