Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill attacking-bluetooth-nfcgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-bluetooth-nfc)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-bluetooth-nfc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-bluetooth-nfc/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-bluetooth-nfc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-bluetooth-nfc.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 32 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.02988 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00049 | $0.01494 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00598 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00299 |
Grade A, and why
attacking-bluetooth-nfc scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 314 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Attacking Bluetooth and NFC
Bluetooth and NFC share a property with early Wi-Fi -- the protocols were designed for convenience in a trusted physical environment, and the trust assumption no longer holds. BLE devices routinely transmit sensitive data in cleartext because the GATT characteristic was "internal", and NFC access cards rely on cryptography that was broken years ago. Physical proximity is not access control.
When to Use
- Assessing BLE peripherals or IoT devices with Bluetooth interfaces
- Testing NFC-based physical access controls (badge readers, door locks)
- Evaluating contactless payment card or transit card security
- Pentesting Bluetooth Classic services (RFCOMM, OBEX, SDP)
- Sniffing or intercepting BLE communication between device and app
- Cloning or replaying NFC/RFID credentials
Scope and authorization. RF work has a legal profile the rest of pentesting does not, because you cannot confine a radio to the target:
- Interception is wiretap law. Capturing BLE or Bluetooth Classic traffic sweeps in whatever else is transmitting nearby — staff phones, medical devices, neighbouring tenants. In the US that implicates the Wiretap Act and ECPA; most jurisdictions have an equivalent. Test in a shielded enclosure or a controlled area where you can account for every device you capture, and discard non-target captures without analysing them.
- Transmitting is regulated. Jamming, active BLE injection, and high-power relay setups can violate FCC Part 15 (or national equivalent) regardless of who owns the target device.
- Cloned access credentials are physical keys. A duplicated badge is forgery-adjacent in many jurisdictions and gets you into spaces the engagement may not cover. Enumerate which doors are in scope before you clone, log every credential you produce, and destroy the clones at the end.
Get physical-site authorization, an RF testing window, and a device inventory in writing — and carry the authorization letter, because RF testing is the scenario where you are most likely to be physically challenged mid-test.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 314 lines · 99 tokens per session scan A 911b58f6c18e
attacking-bluetooth-nfc is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (137 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 2,988 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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