Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill attacking-oauth-oidcgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-oauth-oidc)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-oauth-oidc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-oauth-oidc/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-oauth-oidc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/attacking-oauth-oidc.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 36 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 41 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Prompt Injection · line 336 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 346 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 3 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 225 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00182 | $0.04174 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00091 | $0.02087 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00835 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00417 |
Grade A, and why
attacking-oauth-oidc scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s https://target/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq . How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 367 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Attacking OAuth and OIDC
OAuth is a delegation protocol whose security lives entirely in parameters the
browser forwards — redirect_uri, state, and scope — so most breaks are the
authorization server or the client trusting one of those a little too much. The
token is the prize; the flow is the attack surface. Follow the redirect that
carries the code, and you follow the credential.
Only against systems you are authorized to test.
When to Use
- A login page offers "Sign in with Google / Microsoft / GitHub / Apple" or any federated identity button
- You see
/authorize,/oauth/token,/oauth2/authorize, or a callback URL carryingcode=,state=, or#access_token= - Requests contain
response_type,redirect_uri,client_id,scope, ornonce - An OIDC discovery document is served at
/.well-known/openid-configuration - The app exchanges an authorization code server-side for tokens, or accepts an
id_tokento establish a session - A first-party SPA or mobile app runs the authorization-code-with-PKCE flow
When NOT to Use
- Forging, cracking, or tampering with the issued token itself (alg confusion,
kidinjection, weak HMAC secret,none) — useattacking-jwt - General web application testing unrelated to the auth flow — use
testing-web-applications - The resource API after you already hold a valid access token — use
testing-apis - Entra/Azure AD tenant consent, app registration abuse, and multi-tenant app
attacks specifically — use
attacking-entra-id - The human side — running consent-phishing or illicit-grant campaigns at
scale against real users — use
performing-social-engineering
Enumerate the Server: Discovery Document First
The OIDC discovery document hands you the entire attack map — every endpoint, the supported flows, and the key set.
curl -s https://target/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .
# Also try, per-tenant / per-realm:
# https://target/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
# https://login.target/<tenant>/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration
# https://target/auth/realms/<realm>/.well-known/openid-configuration (Keycloak)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 367 lines · 182 tokens per session scan A 4373ba057c46
attacking-oauth-oidc is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (137 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 182 tokens to every session and 4,174 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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