Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill auditing-supply-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/auditing-supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/auditing-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/auditing-supply-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/auditing-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/auditing-supply-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 80 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 105 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 80 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Prompt Injection · line 242 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00074 | $0.03160 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.01580 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00632 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00316 |
Grade B, and why
auditing-supply-chain scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
| Environment and credential access | Reads of `~/.aws`, `.npmrc`, `.git-credentials`, `process.env` dumps | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
rg -n 'os\.system|subprocess|urllib|requests|__import__|exec\(' <pkg>/setup.py Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
npm pack <pkg> && tar -xzf <pkg>.tgz && rg -n 'child_process|eval\(|Buffer\.from\(.*base64|https?://' package/ Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- auditing-supply-chain — 100% identical, 2 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 301 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Supply Chain
Your build pipeline runs more untrusted code than your application does. A single unpinned action, a postinstall script, or a workflow with a writable token is a path from a stranger's commit to your production artifacts and your signing keys.
When to Use
- Assessing risk from third-party dependencies in an application
- Reviewing CI/CD pipelines, GitHub Actions, and release automation
- Investigating a suspicious or malicious package
- Producing or reviewing an SBOM
- Hardening build provenance and artifact signing
- Responding to a disclosed upstream compromise
When NOT to Use
- Vulnerabilities in first-party code — use
auditing-code-for-vulnerabilities - Model and dataset provenance — use
securing-ai-systems - Cloud infrastructure posture generally — use
exploiting-cloud-platformsfor offensive assessment - An in-progress compromise — use
responding-to-incidents - Prioritizing which of many dependency CVEs to fix first — use
managing-vulnerabilities; reachability analysis here feeds its ranking
Two Different Risks
Keep them separate; they need different responses.
| Known-vulnerable dependency | Malicious dependency | |
|---|---|---|
| Detection | CVE databases, npm audit, osv-scanner |
Behavioural review, install scripts, publisher anomalies |
| Signal | Loud and well-tooled | Quiet; scanners usually miss it |
| Response | Patch, or justify the risk | Incident — assume credentials on the build host are burned |
| Time pressure | Days to weeks | Hours |
Most programs handle the first and are blind to the second. Give the second explicit attention.
Dependency Review
# Known vulnerabilities, ecosystem-agnostic
osv-scanner --lockfile=package-lock.json --lockfile=go.sum --lockfile=Cargo.lock
trivy fs --scanners vuln,secret,misconfig .
grype dir:.
# Ecosystem-native
npm audit --omit=dev && npm ls --all --depth=99 | wc -l # count transitives
pip-audit -r requirements.txt
cargo audit
govulncheck ./... # reachability-aware: only reports vulns you actually call
mvn dependency-check:check
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 301 lines · 74 tokens per session scan B 7cf8db36764d
auditing-supply-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (138 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 74 tokens to every session and 3,160 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (reaches for credential files, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
ci-cd-and-automation
Automates CI/CD pipeline setup. Use when setting up or modifying build and deployment pipelines. Use when you need to automate quality gates, configure test runners in CI, or establish deployment strategies.
google-cloud-slo-alert-configuration
Configures PromQL-based Service Level Objective (SLO) alerting policies for Google Cloud resources registered in App Hub or individually specified. Generates Terraform output. Use when the user asks to configure an SLO or Service Level Objective. Don't use for standard alerting policies.
cloud-build-basics
Teaches the fundamentals of Google Cloud Build (GCB). Covers core concepts, API enablement, console navigation to the Build History page, and the end-to-end workflow for creating and manually running a basic build trigger. Do not use for managing private pools or complex pipeline architectures.
chinese-git-workflow
A reference for configuring Git with Chinese code-hosting services such as Gitee, Coding.net, GitLab China, and CNB, including SSH, HTTPS, credentials, CI, and repository mirroring.
kotlin-tooling-gradle-to-kotlin-toolchain-project
Load when migrating or converting an entire Gradle Kotlin project (build.gradle(.kts), wrapper, libs.versions.toml, buildSrc) to the Kotlin Toolchain, including rewriting CI and replacing Gradle plugins that have no native Toolchain equivalent. Skip for porting one Gradle plugin or general Toolchain work once Gradle…
comet-github-ci-triage
A workflow for diagnosing failed GitHub Actions checks on a Comet pull request. GitHub Actions runs automated builds and tests; a pull request is a proposed code change waiting to be reviewed and merged.