Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill investigating-aws-incidentsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-aws-incidents)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-aws-incidents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-aws-incidents/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-aws-incidents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-aws-incidents.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 193 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00120 | $0.04659 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00060 | $0.02329 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00932 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00466 |
Grade B, and why
investigating-aws-incidents scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
Instance Metadata Service (`http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/...`), Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 382 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Investigating AWS Incidents
In AWS an incident is reconstructed from logs the attacker usually could not delete -- CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and the control plane's own record of every API call. The investigation is therefore a log-correlation exercise anchored on the compromised principal: the access key or assumed role, and the sequence of API calls it made. Find the principal, pull every event it generated, and the rest of the intrusion falls out of the timeline.
When to Use
- Exposed or leaked AWS access keys -- committed to a repo, in a pastebin, or flagged by AWS abuse
- Anomalous CloudTrail activity -- API calls from unfamiliar regions, IPs, or user agents
- A GuardDuty finding -- credential exfiltration, tor traffic, crypto-mining, or anomalous IAM behavior
- Unexpected IAM changes -- new users, keys, roles, login profiles, or policy attachments nobody authorized
- Crypto-mining EC2 -- a spike in on-demand instances, GPU families, or an unexpected billing alert
- S3 data exfiltration -- GetObject spikes, buckets made public, or shared snapshots
When NOT to Use
- The incident is in Microsoft 365 / Entra ID, not AWS -- use
investigating-m365-entra - The incident is in Azure resources/subscriptions -- use
investigating-azure-incidents - The incident is in Google Cloud -- use
investigating-gcp-incidents - The general IR process and host-level response -- use
responding-to-incidents - You are the attacker, not the responder -- use
exploiting-cloud-platforms - The pivot is specifically into Kubernetes on EKS -- use
attacking-eks-gke-aks - Proactive hunting with no confirmed incident -- use
hunting-threats
First-Hour Triage
Three actions, in order: identify the principal, pull its recent activity, preserve before you contain.
Scope the compromised principal. Whether the report is a leaked key, a GuardDuty finding, or a billing spike, resolve it to a single principal ARN -- an IAM user, a role, or the root account. That ARN is the anchor for everything that follows.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 382 lines · 120 tokens per session scan B c0beacdba438
investigating-aws-incidents is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (138 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 120 tokens to every session and 4,659 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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