Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill investigating-azure-incidentsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-azure-incidents)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-azure-incidents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-azure-incidents/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-azure-incidents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/investigating-azure-incidents.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 207 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 225 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 389 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00144 | $0.04909 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00072 | $0.02455 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00029 | $0.00982 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00491 |
Grade B, and why
investigating-azure-incidents scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 421 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Investigating Azure Incidents
In Azure the control plane logs almost everything through Azure Resource Manager, so an incident is reconstructed from the Activity Log and the resource/data-plane logs, anchored on the identity that made the calls -- a user, a service principal, or a managed identity. The recurring trap is that identity lives in Entra while the damage lives in the subscription: you must correlate across both planes, because the Activity Log tells you what was done to a resource but the Entra sign-in log tells you who held the token and from where.
When to Use
- Suspected Azure resource compromise -- a subscription, resource group, or VM behaving as though someone else controls it
- Anomalous Azure Activity Log entries -- writes from unfamiliar callers, IPs, or regions, or an
AccessDeniedstorm that looks like enumeration - A Microsoft Defender for Cloud alert -- crypto-mining, anomalous resource deployment, suspicious sign-in, or IMDS token theft
- Managed-identity or service-principal abuse -- tokens minted for an app or VM being used from somewhere they should never appear
- A crypto-mining VM -- an unexpected spend spike, GPU/large SKUs, or new deployments in regions you do not operate in
- Storage-account or Key Vault exfiltration -- key regeneration, SAS-token minting, public-access changes, disk-snapshot sharing, or secret dumps
When NOT to Use
- The compromise is Entra identity / M365 mailbox, not Azure resources (though you will often need both) -- use
investigating-m365-entra - The incident is in AWS -- use
investigating-aws-incidents - The incident is in Google Cloud -- use
investigating-gcp-incidents - You are the attacker against the tenant, not the responder -- use
attacking-entra-id - The pivot is specifically into AKS / Kubernetes -- use
attacking-eks-gke-aks; for defending the cluster,defending-kubernetes - The general IR process and host-level response -- use
responding-to-incidents
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 421 lines · 144 tokens per session scan B 35173df3a459
investigating-azure-incidents is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (138 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 144 tokens to every session and 4,909 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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