tRPC-Agent-Go is a Go framework for building AI agent applications with language models, graph-based workflows, tools, memory, retrieval, evaluation, and observability. Go developers use it to create deployable agent systems that can integrate with A2A, AG-UI, and MCP. The catalogue add-ons provide reusable workflows and agent integrations for the framework.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add trpc-group/trpc-agent-go --skill mcportergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trpc-group/trpc-agent-goWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/trpc-group/trpc-agent-go/mcporter)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trpc-group/trpc-agent-go/mcporter"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trpc-group/trpc-agent-go/mcporter/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/trpc-group/trpc-agent-go/mcporter"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/trpc-group/trpc-agent-go/mcporter.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 32 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 53 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 87 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00051 | $0.01008 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00403 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00202 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00101 |
Grade A, and why
mcporter scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
mcporter
Use mcporter to work with MCP servers directly.
In OpenClaw, treat mcporter as the execution substrate for MCP-backed
skills. When a user wants to keep an MCP capability for future work, prefer
creating or updating a skill that describes when to use the capability and
stores the repeatable mcporter command path. Do not create a separate runtime
registry when a skill can carry the durable behavior.
Skill-first MCP shape
SKILL.md: triggers, workflow, constraints, examples, and recovery steps.mcp.json: mcporter-native server config when the skill needs a dedicated server definition.references/: schemas, API notes, or longer operation guides.scripts/: wrappers for fragile multi-step calls or post-processing.
Credential handling
- Keep shared, bundled, published, or repo-tracked skills free of raw secrets. Reference environment variables, token helper commands, OAuth login state, runtime config, or platform-managed credentials instead.
- If the user explicitly provides a complete private MCP config or a
credential-bearing endpoint and asks to keep or use it, save it in a local
private config file such as skill-local
mcp.jsonin a writable user-managed skill root, or a dedicated user-managed private mcporter config file. Keep it non-shared and excluded from source control and packaging. Set file permissions to0600when possible. Do not ask the user to re-enter the same value as an environment variable, and do not edit shell startup or trusted env files just to persist it. Do not echo the secret value back in CLI output, logs, or errors; redact or omit token and secret fields from displayed tool results. - For bot-global OpenClaw MCP capabilities, prefer a local skill plus
skill-local
mcp.json. Usemcporter --config path/to/skill/mcp.json ...as the durable command path. Treat~/.mcporter/mcporter.jsonas an interoperability copy when useful, not as the capability boundary. The credential-bearing source of truth for a durable skill run is the explicit--configfile you pass.
For a durable MCP skill, first inspect the server schema:
mcporter --config path/to/skill/mcp.json list <server> --schema --output json
Then call the selected tool with explicit arguments:
mcporter --config path/to/skill/mcp.json call <server.tool> key=value
Quick start
mcporter listmcporter list <server> --schemamcporter call <server.tool> key=value
Call tools
- Selector:
mcporter call linear.list_issues team=ENG limit:5 - Function syntax:
mcporter call "linear.create_issue(title: \"Bug\")" - Full URL:
mcporter call https://api.example.com/mcp.fetch url:https://example.com - Stdio:
mcporter call --stdio "bun run ./server.ts" scrape url=https://example.com - JSON payload:
mcporter call <server.tool> --args '{"limit":5}'
Auth + config
- OAuth:
mcporter auth <server | url> [--reset] - Config:
mcporter config list|get|add|remove|import|login|logout
Daemon
mcporter daemon start|status|stop|restart
Codegen
- CLI:
mcporter generate-cli --server <name>or--command <url> - Inspect:
mcporter inspect-cli <path> [--json] - TS:
mcporter emit-ts <server> --mode client|types
Notes
- Prefer explicit
--configfor skills. mcporter can also use its default project or user config paths for local ad-hoc CLI work, but shared or packaged skills and automation should always pass an explicit--config. - Prefer
--output jsonfor machine-readable results.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 112 lines · 51 tokens per session scan A 9fb515b202fc
mcporter is a skill published in the GitHub repository trpc-group/trpc-agent-go (1,877 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 51 tokens to every session and 1,008 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
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hep-storm
Run a force-robust Stormbreaker loop — route to real agents, execute a verified pipeline to completion.
hep-upload
Publish an Agentlas package to Agent Cloud or the public Hub.
hephaestus-upload
Use when the user types $hephaestus-upload, /hep-upload, or /agentlas-upload, or asks to upload, publish, or list an Agentlas agent or team. Ask Cloud (private) vs Agentlas Hub (public) FIRST, then publish through the bundled Hephaestus gate.
hep-graph
Build an Agentlas automation by describing it, list saved ones, or request a run.
hep-call
Prepare explicitly named Agentlas Hub or Cloud agents.