ZCF is a command-line setup tool for configuring Claude Code and Codex with agents, instructions, skills, hooks, commands, and settings. It is for developers who want to install and personalize these coding-agent workflows through an interactive setup.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UfoMiao/zcfnpx agentmods add skills/ufomiao/zcf/git-worktreeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ufomiao/zcf/git-worktree)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ufomiao/zcf/git-worktree"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ufomiao/zcf/git-worktree/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ufomiao/zcf/git-worktree"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ufomiao/zcf/git-worktree.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 135 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 215 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 136 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 137 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 138 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 216 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 42 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 168 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00028 | $0.02343 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00937 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00469 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00234 |
Grade A, and why
git-worktree scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 272 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Claude Command: Git Worktree
Manage Git worktrees with smart defaults, IDE integration and content migration in structured ../.zcf/project-name/ paths.
Execute commands directly and provide concise results.
Usage
# Basic operations
/git-worktree add <path> # create new branch named <path> from main/master
/git-worktree add <path> -b <branch> # create new branch with specified name
/git-worktree add <path> -o # create and open directly in IDE
/git-worktree list # show all worktree status
/git-worktree remove <path> # remove specified worktree
/git-worktree prune # clean invalid worktree references
# Content migration
/git-worktree migrate <target> --from <source> # migrate uncommitted content
/git-worktree migrate <target> --stash # migrate stash content
Options
| Option | Description |
|---|---|
add [<path>] |
Add new worktree in ../.zcf/project-name/<path> |
migrate <target> |
Migrate content to specified worktree |
list |
List all worktrees and their status |
remove <path> |
Remove worktree at specified path |
prune |
Clean invalid worktree references |
-b <branch> |
Create new branch and checkout to worktree |
-o, --open |
Open directly in IDE after creation (skip prompt) |
--from <source> |
Specify migration source path (migrate only) |
--stash |
Migrate current stash content (migrate only) |
--track |
Set new branch to track corresponding remote branch |
--guess-remote |
Auto guess remote branch for tracking |
--detach |
Create detached HEAD worktree |
--checkout |
Checkout immediately after creation (default behavior) |
--lock |
Lock worktree after creation |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 272 lines · 28 tokens per session scan A ea4dbd731daa
git-worktree is a skill published in the GitHub repository UfoMiao/zcf (6,081 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 28 tokens to every session and 2,343 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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