Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill reviewing-ai-generated-codegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/reviewing-ai-generated-code)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/reviewing-ai-generated-code"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/reviewing-ai-generated-code/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/reviewing-ai-generated-code"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/reviewing-ai-generated-code.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00103 | $0.01398 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00051 | $0.00699 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00280 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00140 |
Grade A, and why
reviewing-ai-generated-code scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 125 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Reviewing AI-generated code: fluent is not correct
Model-written code reads well, which is exactly the risk: it is optimized for plausibility, and a reviewer's guard drops when the code is clean and confident. The security failures cluster in predictable places, dependencies that may not exist or may be attacker-registered, defaults copied from insecure examples, validation quietly omitted, and logic that looks right but is not. Reviewing it means aiming at those clusters, not skimming for style.
When to use
- You are reviewing an AI-authored change, an assistant's suggestion, or a large generated diff.
- Generated infrastructure, config, or access-control code is entering the codebase.
- You are setting a review bar for machine-assisted contributions.
Scope check
Review code for projects you own or contribute to with authorization. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Verify every dependency the code introduces. For each package the change adds, confirm it exists, is the established package (not a lookalike or a name the model may have invented), and is the one you intend. A hallucinated package name an attacker later registers turns "the model suggested it" into installed attacker code. Do not let a plausible import in unverified.
-
Check the defaults and the omissions. Generated code tends to reproduce the most common pattern, which is often the insecure-by-default one: permissive cross-origin rules, disabled verification, a broad permission, a missing auth check, a hardcoded or example secret, an unparameterized query. Read for what should be there and is not, not only for what is.
-
Test the claim against the behavior. Model code often states an intent in a comment or a name the code does not fulfill: a function named validate that does not reject, a check that is computed and then ignored, error handling that swallows and continues. Confirm the security-relevant logic actually does what its surface promises.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 125 lines · 103 tokens per session scan A b6b672400461
reviewing-ai-generated-code is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 103 tokens to every session and 1,398 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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