Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/unitoneai/securityskills/containmentnpx skills add UnitOneAI/SecuritySkills --skill containmentgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnitOneAI/SecuritySkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unitoneai/securityskills/containment)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unitoneai/securityskills/containment"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unitoneai/securityskills/containment.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00080 | $0.05998 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00040 | $0.02999 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.01200 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00600 |
Grade A, and why
containment scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 389 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Incident Containment Strategies -- NIST SP 800-61 Rev 2 / MITRE ATT&CK
Frameworks: NIST SP 800-61 Rev 2 (Containment, Eradication, and Recovery), MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix Role: SOC Analyst, Security Engineer Time: 15-30 min Output: Containment plan with short-term and long-term actions, business impact trade-off analysis, ATT&CK-mapped countermeasures, and rollback criteria
1. When to Use
If a target is provided via arguments, focus the review on: $ARGUMENTS
Invoke this skill when any of the following conditions are met:
- Active incident requires isolation -- A confirmed security incident is in progress and affected systems must be contained to prevent further damage or lateral movement.
- Containment strategy selection -- The responder needs to choose between network isolation, credential revocation, DNS sinkholing, or other containment mechanisms based on incident type and business constraints.
- Business impact vs. security risk trade-off -- The containment action may disrupt business operations and the team needs a structured framework to evaluate the trade-off.
- Attacker technique requires specific countermeasure -- The identified ATT&CK technique dictates a particular containment approach (e.g., credential theft requires credential revocation, not just network isolation).
- Containment effectiveness validation -- Previous containment actions may have been insufficient and the team needs to assess and escalate containment measures.
Do not use when: The task is initial incident triage and classification (use ir-playbook), forensic evidence collection (use forensics-checklist), or post-incident review (use post-incident-review).
2. Context the Agent Needs
Before selecting a containment strategy, gather or confirm:
- Incident classification and severity -- From the ir-playbook assessment (category, SEV level).
- Affected systems inventory -- Hostnames, IPs, cloud resource IDs, services running on affected systems, and their business function.
- Attack vector and techniques -- Known MITRE ATT&CK techniques in use (initial access, lateral movement, persistence, C2).
- Attacker access scope -- What accounts, systems, and network segments has the attacker accessed or potentially compromised?
- Business criticality of affected systems -- Revenue impact, customer impact, SLA obligations, regulatory implications of downtime.
- Network topology -- VLANs, subnets, firewall zones, cloud VPCs, segmentation boundaries relevant to the affected systems.
- Evidence preservation status -- Has volatile evidence been captured? (Reference forensics-checklist.) Containment actions may destroy evidence if not collected first.
- Current containment state -- What actions, if any, have already been taken?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 389 lines · 80 tokens per session scan A d6f643f6c282
containment is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnitOneAI/SecuritySkills (58 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 5,998 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-malware-persistence-with-autoruns
Use Sysinternals Autoruns to systematically identify and analyze malware persistence mechanisms across registry keys, scheduled tasks, services, drivers, and startup locations on Windows systems.
analyzing-memory-forensics-with-lime-and-volatility
Performs Linux memory acquisition using LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) kernel module and analysis with Volatility 3 framework. Extracts process lists, network connections, bash history, loaded kernel modules, and injected code from Linux memory images. Use when performing incident response on compromised Linux systems.
analyzing-persistence-mechanisms-in-linux
Detect and analyze Linux persistence mechanisms including crontab entries, systemd service units, LDPRELOAD hijacking, bashrc modifications, and authorizedkeys backdoors using auditd and file integrity monitoring.
analyzing-memory-dumps-with-volatility
Analyzes RAM memory dumps from compromised systems using the Volatility framework to identify malicious processes, injected code, network connections, loaded modules, and extracted credentials. Supports Windows, Linux, and macOS memory forensics. Activates for requests involving memory forensics, RAM analysis…
cis-aws-foundations-4.1
Ensure CloudTrail is enabled in all regions.
cis-aws-foundations-4.3
Ensure AWS Config is enabled in all regions.