Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/uphiago/recon-skills/attack-patterns-referencenpx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill attack-patterns-referencegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00023 | $0.01217 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00609 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00243 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00122 |
Grade A, and why
attack-patterns-reference scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 125 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Attack Patterns Reference
This catalog maps observed web and WordPress behavior to the skill that owns its validation. Pattern IDs are navigation labels. They do not establish exploitability, severity, prevalence, or a confirmed attack path.
When to Use
- A recon result needs to be classified before focused testing.
- Several verified behaviors may form a candidate attack path.
- A WordPress, CORS, XML-RPC, source-leak, or exposed-service signal needs an owning validation procedure.
Do not use the catalog as a scanner finding list or a substitute for the verification section of the owning skill.
Prerequisites
- An authorized target and current scope constraints.
- Captured evidence for the observation being classified.
- The tools and identities required by the selected follow-up skill.
How to Run
- Match the observed behavior to the closest pattern.
- Open the owning skill listed in the table.
- Check its prerequisites and side effects.
- Run the smallest validation and negative control that can falsify the hypothesis.
- Record the result as observed, inferred, confirmed, or not tested.
Procedure
General Web Patterns
| Pattern | Initial signal | Owning skill |
|---|---|---|
| WordPress user exposure | REST or author route returns user metadata | wp-mass-recon |
| Credentialed CORS | Untrusted origin reflected with credentials | cors-credential-wordpress |
| XML-RPC methods | Protocol-valid system.listMethods response |
xmlrpc-exploitation |
| XML-RPC SSRF | pingback.ping reaches a controlled callback |
xmlrpc-exploitation |
| Public registration | Registration is enabled | wp-mass-recon |
| Plugin surface | REST namespace, asset, or version marker | wordpress-plugin-hunt |
| Staging difference | Non-production host has weaker controls | staging-subdomain-hunt |
| Exposed error log | Response contains real application errors | error-log-mining |
| PHPInfo exposure | PHP configuration page is reachable | phpinfo-to-rce |
| Source or backup leak | Response contains repository, configuration, or database content | source-leak-hunt |
| JavaScript secret candidate | Bundle contains a credential-shaped value | js-secrets-extraction |
| Public service | Non-HTTP or administrative service is internet reachable | port-service-discovery |
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 125 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A dd5684c766ba
attack-patterns-reference is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,209 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 1,217 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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