What is hunt-springboot?

A security-testing guide for finding vulnerabilities specific to Spring Boot, a Java framework for building web applications. It covers management endpoints, expression evaluation, database consoles, and known Spring flaws.

Use it to inspect Spring Boot Actuator endpoints, H2 and Jolokia consoles, SpEL inputs, Spring Cloud Function settings, and affected Spring Framework versions.

It helps detect exposed administration data, leaked credentials, unsafe expression handling, and settings that could let an attacker run commands or stop the application.

hunt-springboot — Skill for Claude Code and Codex by uphiago

About the project

Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.

uphiago/recon-skills · 1,254 stars · on GitHub · hiago.sh

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent

npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-springboot

Clone the repo

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

README.md

[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-springboot/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-springboot)

Your own site

<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-springboot"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-springboot/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

Your own site · 80×15

<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-springboot"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-springboot.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>

Per session 116 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.

When invoked 3,358 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.

Security scan C 3 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits

NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026

SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

high Supply Chain · line 35
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high Supply Chain · line 36
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high Supply Chain · line 70
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high Supply Chain · line 73
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high Supply Chain · line 76
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high Supply Chain · line 154
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high YARA Match · line 175
YARA rule matched a known webshell pattern (PHP, Python, JSP, or ASPX webshell).

Fix: Remove the webshell code immediately. Webshells provide unauthorized remote command execution. Audit the skill for additional backdoors or persistence mechanisms.
high YARA Match · line 175
YARA rule matched a known webshell pattern (PHP, Python, JSP, or ASPX webshell).

Fix: Remove the webshell code immediately. Webshells provide unauthorized remote command execution. Audit the skill for additional backdoors or persistence mechanisms.
high Supply Chain · line 185
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
high Supply Chain · line 188
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
medium Data Exfiltration · line 141
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
medium Data Exfiltration · line 154
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.

How audits are shown

Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.

Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

Model	Per session	Once invoked
Fable 5.1	$0.00116	$0.03358
Opus 5	$0.00058	$0.01679
Sonnet 5	$0.00023	$0.00672
Haiku 4.5	$0.00012	$0.00336

Measured 8d ago against content hash a52de4d0573a, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade C, and why

hunt-springboot scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration

Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.

description: Hunt Spring Boot specific vulnerabilities — Actuator endpoints (heapdump, env, loggers, mappings, shutdown), Spring Expression Language (SpEL) injection → RCE, H2 console RCE, Jolokia JMX exposure, Spring4Sh

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain

curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-application-context\|x-content-type"

redteam/hunt-springboot/SKILL.md · 259 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 259 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

HUNT-SPRINGBOOT — Spring Boot Specific Vulnerabilities

Crown Jewel Targets

Spring Boot Actuator /actuator/heapdump exposed = heap dump with all secrets in memory.

Highest-value findings:

/actuator/heapdump — full JVM heap dump contains plaintext passwords, tokens, DB credentials, private keys stored anywhere in memory
/actuator/env — lists all environment variables and Spring properties including secrets
/actuator/shutdown — POST → shuts down the application (Critical availability impact)
H2 Console (/h2-console) — in-memory DB admin UI → SQL query execution → potential RCE via CREATE ALIAS trick
SpEL injection — Spring Expression Language in template fields, @Value annotations, SpEL-processed request params → RCE
Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965 — Spring Framework < 5.3.18 + Tomcat → RCE via data binding

Phase 1 — Fingerprint Spring Boot

# Spring Boot indicators
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-application-context\|x-content-type"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whitelabel Error Page\|Spring Boot\|org.springframework"

# Actuator root (may list available endpoints)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator/" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null

# Try common base paths
for base in "" "/manage" "/management" "/app"; do
  STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$base/actuator")
  [ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] Actuator at: $TARGET$base/actuator"
done

Phase 2 — Actuator Endpoint Enumeration

BASE="https://$TARGET/actuator"

# High-impact endpoints
ENDPOINTS=("env" "heapdump" "threaddump" "mappings" "beans" "metrics" 
           "loggers" "info" "health" "configprops" "shutdown" "trace"
           "httptrace" "auditevents" "sessions" "scheduledtasks" "caches"
           "flyway" "liquibase" "refresh" "restart")

for EP in "${ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
  # Don't trust HTTP 200 alone — Spring returns 200 with a Whitelabel/login
  # page for many paths. Require actuator-shaped JSON (or a heapdump body)
  # before calling it EXPOSED.
  BODY=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -H "Accept: application/json" "$BASE/$EP")
  CT=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{content_type}" -H "Accept: application/json" "$BASE/$EP")
  if echo "$CT" | grep -qi "json" && ! echo "$BODY" | grep -qi "Whitelabel Error Page\|<html"; then
    echo "[+] EXPOSED: $BASE/$EP"
  fi
done

# Get environment variables (passwords, API keys)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/env" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i "password\|secret\|key\|token\|credential" | head -20

# Get all endpoint mappings (full API surface)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/mappings" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -Eo '"pattern":"\K[^"]+' | sort

# Get Spring beans (lists all registered beans, reveals internal architecture)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/beans" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -100

Read the full file on GitHub · 259 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

8d ago First seen · 259 lines · 116 tokens per session scan C a52de4d0573a

Subscribe to this mod's changes

hunt-springboot is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 116 tokens to every session and 3,358 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (harvests environment variables, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.

Backend and APIs Security bug-bounty cloud-security cors-exploitation firebase-hacking hermes-agent hunt jwt-attacks redteam springboot

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