Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill m365-entra-attackgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/m365-entra-attack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/m365-entra-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/m365-entra-attack/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/m365-entra-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/m365-entra-attack.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00128 | $0.05747 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00064 | $0.02874 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00026 | $0.01149 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00575 |
Grade A, and why
m365-entra-attack scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, ssl, time, json, os Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- m365-entra-attack — 95% identical, 35 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 412 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
When to use this skill
Trigger when:
- Target uses M365 / Entra ID (autodiscover.* records, login.microsoftonline.com redirects, "Microsoft Office 365" in tech-stack notes)
- You have a list of corporate emails or stealer-leaked creds
- Engagement involves "credential spray", "password spray", "Entra attack", "ATO via M365"
- You see
*.onmicrosoft.com,*-my.sharepoint.com,enterpriseregistration.*,enterpriseenrollment.*in recon - Client mentions "Conditional Access", "MFA bypass", "compliant device"
DO NOT use for:
- On-prem-only Active Directory (use a separate AD-attack skill)
- Service-to-service token attacks (different threat model)
- Phishing-required attack chains (covered by phishing skills) — but you can prep for the credential-validation step here
Tenant discovery (msftrecon)
# For each owned domain
msftrecon -d client.example
msftrecon -d clientltd.example
msftrecon -d sister-brand-school.example
Key fields in output:
- Tenant ID (different domains may share OR have separate tenants — always test all owned domains)
- Federation Information.Namespace Type =
Managed(cloud-only, ROPC works) |Federated(ADFS, different attack) - SharePoint Detected (Yes = OneDrive enum vector available)
- Communication Services Teams/Skype (post-auth lateral targets)
- Admin Consent Endpoint accessible (consent-phishing surface)
Red flag: if the org has multiple Entra tenants for sister domains, each is a separate attack surface with its own user list, lockout policy, and CA configuration. Don't assume one spray covers all.
AADSTS code reference (memorize)
| AADSTS | Meaning | Lockout impact | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50034 | User does not exist | None | Skip; remove from spray list |
| 50126 | Invalid username/password | +1 attempt counter | User exists — try alternate password later (within cap) |
| 50053 | Account locked (Smart Lockout) | None (already locked) | Pre-existing → flag to SOC; don't retry |
| 53003 | CA blocked token issuance | +1 attempt counter | PASSWORD VALID — STOP, password is correct |
| 50076 | MFA required | +1 attempt counter | PASSWORD VALID — second factor needed |
| 50079 | Strong auth required | +1 attempt counter | PASSWORD VALID — same as 50076 |
| 50158 | External auth required | +1 attempt counter | PASSWORD VALID — federated MFA |
| 530003 | Device-state required | +1 attempt counter | PASSWORD VALID — needs compliant device |
| 65001 | Consent required | +1 attempt counter | App-consent issue, not auth |
| 700016 | App not in tenant | None | User in different tenant — adjust target |
| 90002 | Tenant does not exist | None | Tenant typo / dead tenant |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 412 lines · 128 tokens per session scan A 47b08ee89c5d
m365-entra-attack is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 128 tokens to every session and 5,747 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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