Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill triage-validationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/triage-validation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/triage-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/triage-validation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/triage-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/triage-validation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00087 | $0.05161 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.02580 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.01032 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00516 |
Grade A, and why
triage-validation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- triage-validation — 95% identical, 40 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 399 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
TRIAGE & VALIDATION
One wrong answer = STOP this finding. Kill the finding. Move on to the next test class.
Scope of "STOP" in this skill: This skill's gates kill INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS that fail validation. They do NOT authorize stopping the engagement. Killing a finding via the 7-Question Gate just means that finding doesn't get submitted — every other test class in the engagement is still pending. See
redteam-mindset"DO NOT STOP primary directive" for the coverage-axis rule.
"N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes all 7 questions."
THE 7-QUESTION GATE
Ask IN ORDER. One wrong answer = STOP immediately.
Q1: Can an attacker use this RIGHT NOW, step by step?
Complete this template:
1. Setup: I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body — copy-paste ready]
3. Result: I can [read / modify / delete] [exact data shown in response]
4. Impact: The real-world consequence is [account takeover / PII read / money stolen]
5. Cost: Time: [X minutes], Capital: [$0 / $X subscription required]
If you CANNOT write step 2 as a real HTTP request → KILL IT.
Q2: Is the impact on the program's accepted impact list?
Go to the program page. Find "Vulnerability Types" or "Out of Scope."
Common tiers:
- Critical: Any-user ATO without interaction, RCE, SQLi with data exfil, admin auth bypass
- High: Mass PII exfil, privilege escalation, internal SSRF with data, stored XSS all users
- Medium: IDOR on specific user non-critical data, XSS on sensitive page requiring click
- Low: Non-sensitive info disclosure, clickjacking with PoC
If your bug maps to a listed exclusion → KILL IT.
Q3: Is the root cause in an in-scope asset?
Confirm:
- Vulnerable domain is on the in-scope list (not
*.internal.target.com) - It's a production asset (not staging/dev unless explicitly in scope)
- It's not a third-party service the company just uses (not Stripe, Salesforce, Google Auth)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 399 lines · 87 tokens per session scan A 730cb07569ee
triage-validation is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,251 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 87 tokens to every session and 5,161 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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