Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/main/.agents/skills/async-job-orchestration/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gatewayWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/async-job-orchestration)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/async-job-orchestration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/async-job-orchestration/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/async-job-orchestration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/async-job-orchestration.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 542 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 289 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 292 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 293 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 294 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 295 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 296 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Rogue Agent · line 404 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.07427 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.03714 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.01485 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00743 |
Grade A, and why
async-job-orchestration scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 556 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Async Job Orchestration
Async execution is available for Claude, Codex, Gemini, Grok, Mistral, Devin,
and Cursor when the gateway registers async tools. SQLite and PostgreSQL stores
preserve jobs across gateway restarts; acknowledged memory storage lasts only
for the process lifetime; persistence.backend = "none" registers no async or
job tools. See Durability & Dedup.
Mistral Vibe: the gateway always emits
--agent <mode>and defaults toaccept-editsfor programmatic callers. Mistral usesapprovalStrategy:"legacy":mcp_managedis rejected before launch andapprovalPolicyhas no effect. Current Vibe defaults session logging on;doctor --jsonflags an explicit[session_logging] enabled = falsebefore session-continuity use.
Dispatch Defaults
Apply these on every dispatch unless the caller has explicitly overridden a rule in the current turn:
- Omit
model: let the gateway use its configured default per CLI. Nominating a model risks deprecated IDs (o3,o3-pro,gpt-4o, …) and capability mismatches. - Managed approval is Claude-only. Use
approvalStrategy:"mcp_managed"only withclaude_requestorclaude_request_async. The gateway makes a request-scoped--strict-mcp-configfrom only provisioned gateway-owned local MCP definitions; dynamicnpx, ambientPATH, and Codex-config overrides are excluded. UseapprovalStrategy:"legacy"for Codex, Gemini, Grok, Mistral, Devin, and Cursor. They rejectmcp_managedbefore launch because their ambient MCP configuration cannot be isolated.approvalPolicyis valid only for Claude managed requests and has no effect with legacy. - No caller-imposed wallclock timeout; poll every 60 s by default: see Polling Strategy below. When the user requests a 90-second progress cadence, do not poll earlier. Do not cancel jobs for taking too long; cancel only on explicit instruction or hard failure.
idleTimeoutMsis separate: a no-output safeguard for incremental providers, and a total-runtime bound for terminal-burst ones (see Idle Timeout and Runtime Cap). - Complete mandatory reviews without a cap. Dispatch review work only through
the current local stdio gateway MCP surface. Require the terminal JSON verdict
APPROVED_UNCONDITIONALLY,CHANGES_REQUIRED, orBLOCKED_EXTERNAL. OnCHANGES_REQUIRED, a qualified result, incomplete evidence, or malformed output, fix or rebut findings with evidence and re-review the same required reviewer. Do not set a review round, turn, token, price, budget, or wallclock limit. A failed or unavailable required reviewer must be retained asBLOCKED_EXTERNALwith its exact error, never treated as approved. Repair and retry it until it returnsAPPROVED_UNCONDITIONALLY, or stop only for explicit user cancellation or a terminal external blocker.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 556 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 2399047b5d7e
async-job-orchestration is a skill published in the GitHub repository verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway (15 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 7,427 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
provider-integration
Adds new AI providers to claude-council, configures provider API settings, troubleshoots provider connections, and documents the provider script interface. Covers creating provider shell scripts, setting API keys, and validating connectivity. Triggers on "add provider", "new AI agent", "provider not working", "API…
architect
System design, tradeoffs, and complex technical decisions.
security-analyst
Threat-model and find vulnerabilities, with practical remediation.
plan-reviewer
Validate that a work plan is executable before work starts.
researcher
Research external libraries, APIs, and best practices, with evidence.
debugger
Rank root-cause hypotheses and propose the smallest safe fix.