Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/main/.agents/skills/implement-review-fix/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gatewayWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/implement-review-fix)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/implement-review-fix"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/implement-review-fix.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Output Handling · line 102 Output size or generation rate is not bounded. Unbounded output enables denial-of-service through resource exhaustion, log flooding, or context-window stuffing.Fix: Set explicit limits on output length, generation count, and rate. Use max_tokens and truncation to prevent unbounded output.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.02305 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.01153 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00461 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00231 |
Grade A, and why
implement-review-fix scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 213 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implement, Review, Fix
Use one parent orchestrator. It may call gateway providers, but provider jobs do not recursively orchestrate other providers. Every review dispatch uses the installed local stdio gateway MCP surface, never a direct provider binary, SDK, connector/shadow gateway, or ad hoc shell fallback.
Outcome contract
The cycle ends only after the final change set has relevant local verification
and every required reviewer returns evidence-backed
APPROVED_UNCONDITIONALLY. Do not use an arbitrary review-round, turn, token,
price, budget, or wallclock cap. A timeout, malformed reply, residual
condition, unavailable reviewer, or qualified approval is not approval.
Repair and re-review until all required reviewers approve. If a provider reaches
a terminal external failure, retain the error/repair evidence and report
INCOMPLETE or BLOCKED; do not silently reduce the review roster. Stop only
on explicit user cancellation or after reporting the terminal blocker.
Explicit user-authorized full-access review override
Keep the ordinary implementation and inspection defaults below unless the user
explicitly authorizes full provider permissions and native MCP access for the
review. In that case, follow the complete multi-llm-review full-access
protocol rather than weakening it into a safe-default example: build the target
checkout, launch node dist/index.js --transport=stdio from that checkout, and
do not use a globally installed or stale gateway process.
Apply the current provider-native full-access control on every new review job, preserve ambient provider MCP configuration without gateway tool allowlists, and do not assume a resumed session retained the grant. Give every reviewer the verification report as a corrective-program specification plus the exact base, diff or changed-file list, and persistent evidence locations. Require independent code, docs, tests, and command inspection. A report claim, intent, or green-check summary is never approval; a disputed finding needs direct code/doc/test evidence.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 213 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A d078aaadb637
implement-review-fix is a skill published in the GitHub repository verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway (15 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 2,305 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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architect
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code-reviewer
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plan-reviewer
Validate that a work plan is executable before work starts.
researcher
Research external libraries, APIs, and best practices, with evidence.
security-analyst
Threat-model and find vulnerabilities, with practical remediation.