Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/main/.agents/skills/multi-llm-review/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gatewayWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/multi-llm-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/multi-llm-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/multi-llm-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/multi-llm-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway/multi-llm-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Prompt Injection · line 79 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 83 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 84 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 85 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Output Handling · line 109 Output size or generation rate is not bounded. Unbounded output enables denial-of-service through resource exhaustion, log flooding, or context-window stuffing.Fix: Set explicit limits on output length, generation count, and rate. Use max_tokens and truncation to prevent unbounded output.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 206 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Excessive Agency · line 212 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 214 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00061 | $0.04889 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.02445 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00978 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00489 |
Grade A, and why
multi-llm-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 398 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Multi-LLM Code Review
Use this skill for a real review gate, not a popularity vote or a summary-only second opinion. Dispatch review requests through the current agent's local stdio gateway MCP surface, never a direct provider CLI, shadow connector, or remote gateway when the requested validation path is stdio.
Completion contract
A required reviewer is complete only when it inspected the target and returned
an evidence-backed APPROVED_UNCONDITIONALLY. A qualified approval, a
conditional result, missing evidence, a malformed response, a timeout, or a
provider error is not approval.
Do not set a review-round, turn, token, price, budget, or wallclock cap. Do not
use route_request, select:"cheapest", maxCostUsd, maxOutputTokens,
maxTurns, maxPrice, or a provider print deadline to reduce an exhaustive
review. Continue evidence-based repair and re-review until every required
healthy reviewer returns APPROVED_UNCONDITIONALLY, the user explicitly
cancels, or it returns BLOCKED_EXTERNAL with a concrete external error. A
blocked reviewer never becomes an implied approval.
Discover the actual roster
The gateway has seven canonical CLI provider types: Claude, Codex, Gemini (Antigravity), Grok, Mistral Vibe, Devin, and Cursor Agent. Start a full CLI review with all seven in its intended roster. Before dispatching, inspect what this gateway can actually run:
cli_versions()
list_models()
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"claude"})
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"codex"})
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"gemini"})
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"grok"})
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"mistral"})
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"devin"})
provider_tool_capabilities({cli:"cursor"})
Use provider-tools://{provider} as a cached read-only alternative. Optional
API providers are configured availability discovered through list_models and
their reported capabilities. They have no local CLI checkout/worktree or native
ACP guarantee, so they are not silently interchangeable with a required
source-inspecting CLI reviewer.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 398 lines · 61 tokens per session scan A 68b80946b1cd
multi-llm-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository verivus-oss/llm-cli-gateway (15 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 61 tokens to every session and 4,889 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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architect
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scope-analyst
Catch ambiguities and hidden requirements before planning.
security-analyst
Threat-model and find vulnerabilities, with practical remediation.
code-reviewer
Find bugs, security holes, and maintainability issues in a diff or file.
plan-reviewer
Validate that a work plan is executable before work starts.
researcher
Research external libraries, APIs, and best practices, with evidence.