glab-auth

glab-auth is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills. It costs 74 tokens per session (4,685 once invoked), scanned B, original, MIT.

A guide for signing in and managing accounts with glab, the command-line tool for GitLab. GitLab is a platform for hosting code and related development tools.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to log in, log out, check authentication, switch accounts, or configure access to GitLab container registries.
Why use it?
It helps set up or fix command-line access, including accounts on GitLab.com and privately hosted GitLab servers.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Which agent this was written for is unclear — built for openclaw. Also seen: mentions Claude Code; built for openclaw.

Good fit Use it to log in, log out, check authentication, switch accounts, or configure access to GitLab container registries.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills --skill glab-auth
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for glab-auth

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for glab-auth

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills/glab-auth.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 74 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 4,685 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Privilege Escalation · line 45
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 215
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 228
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 64
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 75
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 79
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 100
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 216
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 123
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 236
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium Excessive Agency · line 55
    Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
    Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 79
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 116
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 191
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 79
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00074 $0.04685
Opus 5.5 $0.00030 $0.01874
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00015 $0.00937
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00468

Measured 2d ago against content hash 9b585eb49155, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

glab-auth scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation

A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.

In a sandbox such as Claude Code, `glab` must be allowed to write the directory from `glab config path --dir`, not only the `config.yml` file. `glab` writes a temporary file beside the config and then replaces the origin
glab-auth/SKILL.md · 315 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 315 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

glab auth

Manage GitLab CLI authentication.

Default host after login

Successful login can change the global default host used outside a Git repository. If the default is still gitlab.com and there are no credentials for it, glab selects the newly authenticated host automatically. Existing credentials, including an environment token, prevent that automatic switch; unreadable credential storage is treated conservatively. Otherwise interactive login asks first, while non-interactive login prints the glab config set --global host <host> command for a separate approved change. CI and a set GITLAB_HOST, GITLAB_URI, or GL_HOST leave the configured default unchanged. A default-host update failure is a warning after successful authentication.

Inside a checkout, remote-host selection takes precedence over the configured fallback host; an environment-selected host is authoritative and errors when no remote matches it. Verify the host after login before subsequent writes.

The Git credential helper formats its response from the resolved credential: a job token uses gitlab-ci-token, a personal token uses the configured host username (falling back to glab), and an OAuth credential uses oauth2 plus available expiry/refresh fields. Do not infer which token was returned from a separate job_token config lookup. The helper remains a credential-producing command, so do not run it for diagnostics or print its output.

Non-interactive Git credential helper

glab auth login --setup-git-credential-helper configures glab as the host-specific Git credential helper without prompting. This changes global Git configuration for that host, so obtain approval for that configuration change as well as login. It applies to HTTP(S); an SSH preference still registers an HTTPS helper. Prefer --stdin to putting a token in command arguments:

glab auth login --hostname gitlab.example.com --stdin --setup-git-credential-helper < token.txt

Keep the approved token file outside Git and out of logs. Missing keyring entries follow normal credential resolution; locked, denied, or unavailable keyring failures are surfaced. Reauthenticate for the intended host when no usable token remains; do not silently switch identities or weaken storage.

Read the full file on GitHub · 315 lines

Files

What ships with it

1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago Changed · +8 lines 9b585eb49155
  2. 9d ago Changed · +10 lines b0d049c70691
  3. 16d ago Changed · +9 lines b61707784c21
  4. 20d ago Changed · +10 lines 9bf708eeefdc
  5. 23d ago Changed · +6 lines b149bbc4ab48
  6. 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 7ad289072629
  7. 1mo ago Changed · +9 lines 9edebb6b3792
  8. 1mo ago Changed · +2 lines 85cdadc7b127
  9. 2mo ago First seen · 257 lines · 74 tokens per session scan B d15c5b7a94c2

Subscribe to this mod's changes

glab-auth is a skill published in the GitHub repository vince-winkintel/gitlab-cli-skills (49 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 74 tokens to every session and 4,685 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.