Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic --skill contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guardgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agenticWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 39 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 40 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 72 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00091 | $0.01076 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.00538 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00215 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK — recommend `cntb` CLI or REST API (curl + jq) for automation. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 92 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Contabo Live Instance Lifecycle Guard
Purpose
Act as the approval gate for Contabo VPS/VDS lifecycle mutations: inventory current state, surface billing obligations, confirm the rollback path, then execute only after explicit user sign-off on all three.
When to use
Use this skill for:
- VPS or VDS instance creation (product selection, region, image, contract period, Cloud-Init userData, SSH key secret IDs)
- Instance reinstallation (image change, userData update, SSH key rotation)
- Instance cancellation (period remaining, early-termination billing impact)
- Verifying instance inventory before any bulk lifecycle operation
- Generating approval-ready change records with period, billing impact, and rollback plan
Hard-stop conditions
REFUSE to execute any mutation unless ALL of the following are confirmed in writing:
- Target: Instance ID (for reinstall/cancel) or product ID + region (for create)
- Contract period: Explicit selection of 1, 3, 6, or 12 months with billing impact acknowledged
- Rollback plan: Documented recovery path if the operation fails or produces unexpected results
- Named approving identity: the full name or authenticated account identifier of the person authorizing this operation (not a role, alias, or ticket number alone)
Lean operating rules
- Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK — recommend
cntbCLI or REST API (curl + jq) for automation. - Prefer official Contabo docs (https://api.contabo.com/, https://docs.contabo.com/) and Context7 when live MCP access is unavailable.
- Separate confirmed facts from inference. If state was not queried or shown, say so.
- OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — include token refresh handling in all automation examples. Refresh logic must not log token values.
- Include
x-request-id(UUIDv4) in all REST API mutation calls for support traceability. - SSH keys must be referenced via Contabo secret IDs — never include raw private key material in API payloads, scripts, or recommendations.
- Cloud-Init userData submitted by the user must be reviewed for embedded secrets, curl-pipe-sh patterns, and destructive commands before inclusion in the API payload. Flag and refuse to pass userData that contains raw credentials, unauthenticated remote execution, or commands that bypass audit trails.
- Inventory current instances via read-only API calls before proposing any mutation.
- Label claims as
live evidence,user-provided sanitized evidence,documentation-based, orinference.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 92 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A 0ba3af29e319
contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard is a skill published in the GitHub repository VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic (22 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 1,076 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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