Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add waybarrios/opencode-power-pack --skill sharp-edgesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/waybarrios/opencode-power-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack/sharp-edges)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack/sharp-edges"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack/sharp-edges/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack/sharp-edges"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack/sharp-edges.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 65 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Rogue Agent · line 80 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 119 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- high Prompt Injection · line 125 This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
- high Prompt Injection · line 287 This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 84 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 138 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 167 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.02470 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00988 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00494 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00247 |
Grade A, and why
sharp-edges scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
5 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- sharp-edges — 91% identical, 15 lines differ
- sharp-edges — 91% identical, 12 lines differ
- sharp-edges — 88% identical, 11 lines differ
- sharp-edges — 88% identical, 44 lines differ
- sharp-edges — 88% identical, 11 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 290 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Sharp Edges Analysis
Evaluates whether APIs, configurations, and interfaces are resistant to developer misuse. Identifies designs where the "easy path" leads to insecurity.
When to Use
- Reviewing API or library design decisions
- Auditing configuration schemas for dangerous options
- Evaluating cryptographic API ergonomics
- Assessing authentication/authorization interfaces
- Reviewing any code that exposes security-relevant choices to developers
When NOT to Use
- Implementation bugs (use standard code review)
- Business logic flaws (use domain-specific analysis)
- Performance optimization (different concern)
Core Principle
The pit of success: Secure usage should be the path of least resistance. If developers must understand cryptography, read documentation carefully, or remember special rules to avoid vulnerabilities, the API has failed.
Rationalizations to Reject
| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
|---|---|---|
| "It's documented" | Developers don't read docs under deadline pressure | Make the secure choice the default or only option |
| "Advanced users need flexibility" | Flexibility creates footguns; most "advanced" usage is copy-paste | Provide safe high-level APIs; hide primitives |
| "It's the developer's responsibility" | Blame-shifting; you designed the footgun | Remove the footgun or make it impossible to misuse |
| "Nobody would actually do that" | Developers do everything imaginable under pressure | Assume maximum developer confusion |
| "It's just a configuration option" | Config is code; wrong configs ship to production | Validate configs; reject dangerous combinations |
| "We need backwards compatibility" | Insecure defaults can't be grandfather-claused | Deprecate loudly; force migration |
Sharp Edge Categories
1. Algorithm/Mode Selection Footguns
APIs that let developers choose algorithms invite choosing wrong ones.
The JWT Pattern (canonical example):
- Header specifies algorithm: attacker can set
"alg": "none"to bypass signatures - Algorithm confusion: RSA public key used as HMAC secret when switching RS256→HS256
- Root cause: Letting untrusted input control security-critical decisions
What ships with it
16 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/auth-patterns.md 6.8 KB
- references/case-studies.md 8.0 KB
- references/config-patterns.md 9.5 KB
- references/crypto-apis.md 5.2 KB
- references/lang-c.md 5.5 KB
- references/lang-csharp.md 7.2 KB
- references/lang-go.md 6.5 KB
- references/lang-java.md 6.7 KB
- references/lang-javascript.md 6.8 KB
- references/lang-kotlin.md 6.6 KB
- references/lang-php.md 6.0 KB
- references/lang-python.md 6.5 KB
- references/lang-ruby.md 6.1 KB
- references/lang-rust.md 6.4 KB
- references/lang-swift.md 6.1 KB
- references/language-specific.md 13 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 290 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A 9d3fd8c3b27c
sharp-edges is a skill published in the GitHub repository waybarrios/opencode-power-pack (541 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 2,470 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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code-review-excellence
Effective code review — feedback, bug-catching, knowledge sharing. Use for PR reviews, standards, or mentoring.