Agentic Plugin Marketplace is a collection of reusable plugins, agents, skills, commands, and rules for coding-agent tools including Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor, OpenCode, Antigravity CLI, and GitHub Copilot. It is for developers assembling agentic workflows across multiple harnesses from shared Markdown sources, and the catalogue entries are examples or subsets of those workflow components.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add wshobson/agents --skill block-no-verify-hookgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/wshobson/agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/wshobson/agents/block-no-verify-hook)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/wshobson/agents/block-no-verify-hook"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/wshobson/agents/block-no-verify-hook/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/wshobson/agents/block-no-verify-hook"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/wshobson/agents/block-no-verify-hook.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 20 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 133 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 21 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 23 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Agent Snooping · line 87 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 106 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 110 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 110 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- medium Rogue Agent · line 109 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.02045 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00818 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00409 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00204 |
Grade C, and why
block-no-verify-hook scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 25d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
2. **Inspection**: Claude Code sends the tool call to the hook as JSON on stdin and sets no `$TOOL_INPUT` variable. The hook searches the `command` value in that JSON with `grep -E`, so it needs no `jq` or `node`, and te Reads agent configuration directoriesmediumAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
cat > .claude/settings.json << 'EOF' Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- block-no-verify-hook — 100% identical, 63 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 207 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Block No-Verify Hook
PreToolUse hook configuration that intercepts and blocks bypass-flag usage before execution, ensuring AI agents cannot skip pre-commit hooks, GPG signing, or other git safety mechanisms.
Overview
AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, etc.) can run shell commands with flags like --no-verify that bypass pre-commit hooks. This defeats the purpose of linting, formatting, testing, and security checks configured in pre-commit hooks. The block-no-verify hook adds a PreToolUse guard that rejects any tool call containing bypass flags before execution.
Problem
When AI agents commit code, they may use bypass flags to avoid hook failures:
# These commands skip pre-commit hooks entirely
git commit --no-verify -m "quick fix"
git push --no-verify
git commit --no-gpg-sign -m "unsigned commit"
git merge --no-verify feature-branch
This allows:
- Unformatted code to enter the repository
- Linting errors to bypass checks
- Security scanning to be skipped
- Unsigned commits to bypass signing policies
- Test suites to be circumvented
Solution
Add a PreToolUse hook to .claude/settings.json that inspects every Bash tool call and blocks commands containing bypass flags.
Configuration
Add the following to your project's .claude/settings.json:
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "if grep -qE '\"command\"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*\"([^\"\\\\]|\\\\.)*(--no-(ver|g)|commit([^\"\\\\]|\\\\.)*([[:space:]]|\\\\[tn])-[a-zA-Z]*n)'; then echo 'BLOCKED: --no-verify and --no-gpg-sign flags are not allowed. Run the commit without bypass flags so that pre-commit hooks execute properly.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
}
]
}
]
}
}
How It Works
- Matcher: The hook targets only
Bashtool calls, so it does not interfere with other tools (Read, Edit, Grep, etc.). - Inspection: Claude Code sends the tool call to the hook as JSON on stdin and sets no
$TOOL_INPUTvariable. The hook searches thecommandvalue in that JSON withgrep -E, so it needs nojqornode, and text in other fields, such ascwdor the tool call's description, can't trigger it. It blocks--no-verify,--no-gpg-sign, and any shorter prefix of them that git accepts, e.g.,--no-veri. It also blocks a short option group withnthat followscommitin the same command, e.g.,-nor-nm, because-nis the short form of--no-verify. The hook doesn't look for the wordgit, so it also catchesif git ...,sudo git ..., andg=git; $g commit --no-verify. A false match, such as a commit message that mentions a flag, blocks the call, which is the safe way to fail. - Blocking: If a bypass flag is found in a git command, the hook exits with code 2 and prints an error message. Exit code 2 signals Claude Code to reject the tool call entirely.
- Pass-through: If no bypass flag is found, the hook exits with code 0 and the command executes normally.
- Limits: The hook checks text, so it stops an agent that reaches for a bypass flag out of habit. It doesn't stop an agent that sets out to evade it, e.g., by building the flag from pieces or by running
git -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null commit.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 25d ago Changed · +13 lines scan B → C d8e59e994efd
- 1mo ago First seen · 194 lines · 46 tokens per session scan B 110e5e8ca259
block-no-verify-hook is a skill published in the GitHub repository wshobson/agents (41,474 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 2,045 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (asks for root, reads agent configuration directories). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
what-did-i-get-done
Summarize authored commits over a user-specified time period into a concise update.
research-git
Scans public GitHub repos for skills, practices, and code patterns. Use when studying how open-source teams configure monorepo CI and PR review, or enriching skills.
cross-repo-cache
Check if cross-repo coordinator results can be reused, avoiding redundant Sonnet agent launches. Compares peer repo git hashes against stored hashes from last coordinator run. Triggers on: entering Phase 1.4.1, checking cross-repo cache, before discovering peers. Returns CROSSREPOCACHEHIT with cached status or…
dev-git-commit-message
Generates or validates Conventional Commits messages from staged diffs. Use when drafting commit messages, checking repo rules, or inferring scope from changed files.
atlas-changelog
Maintain per-repo and cross-repo changelogs — append structured entries after agent work. Use when asked to "log this change", "update changelog", "what changed", "change history".
apex-status
CTO-level project status from git and codebase state. Use when asked "where are we", "project status", "what's done", or at the start of a work session.