Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill hardening-docker-daemon-configurationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 30 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 41 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 43 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 44 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 240 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 333 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 218 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 236 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 237 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 243 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 319 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 250 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 318 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 51 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 240 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 137 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 318 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 201 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 202 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 205 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 206 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00036 | $0.02545 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01273 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00509 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00254 |
Grade B, and why
hardening-docker-daemon-configuration scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- Root or sudo access to the Docker host Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/rootless | sh Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/rootless | sh How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 336 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hardening Docker Daemon Configuration
Overview
The Docker daemon (dockerd) runs with root privileges and controls all container operations. Hardening its configuration through /etc/docker/daemon.json, TLS certificates, user namespace remapping, and network restrictions is essential to prevent privilege escalation, lateral movement, and container breakout attacks.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring hardening docker daemon configuration capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Common Misconfigurations & Verification
- Remote API exposed without mTLS:
"hosts": ["tcp://0.0.0.0:2376"]with"tlsverify"absent (or any listener on2375) is unauthenticated root over the network. Verify:ss -tlnp | grep -E '2375|2376'anddocker infoshould report TLS; client must use--tlsverify. userns-remapdefeated per-container: even with"userns-remap": "default", a container started with--userns=host(or--privileged, which implies it) maps back to real root. Confirmcat /etc/subuidshowsdockremap:and that workloads do not pass--userns=host.icc: falsegives false comfort: it only blocks the default bridge; user-defined bridges still allow container-to-container traffic. Verify withdocker network inspect bridge --format '{{.Options}}'.- Rootless claimed but daemon still root: check
docker info | grep -i rootlessreturnsRootless: trueand the socket is under$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, not/var/run/docker.sockowned by root. - Socket permissions too broad: confirm
/var/run/docker.sockisroot:docker 660, not world-accessible, and is never bind-mounted into containers. no-new-privileges/ seccomp not applied:docker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'should listseccompandno-new-privileges; an empty/unconfinedseccomp is a finding.- Verify the full config: run
docker/docker-bench-securityand resolve section 2 (daemon)[WARN]s.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 336 lines · 36 tokens per session scan B 3539304d1718
hardening-docker-daemon-configuration is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (971 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 2,545 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (asks for root, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
hardening-docker-daemon-configuration
Harden the Docker daemon by configuring daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS authentication, rootless mode, and CIS benchmark controls.
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Use when investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence. Use when working with analyzing docker container forensics.
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence.
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence.
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence.
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence.