Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xobotyi/cc-foundry --skill containersgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xobotyi/cc-foundryWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xobotyi/cc-foundry/containers)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xobotyi/cc-foundry/containers"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xobotyi/cc-foundry/containers/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xobotyi/cc-foundry/containers"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xobotyi/cc-foundry/containers.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 33 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 35 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 38 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Rogue Agent · line 77 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 172 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 175 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 177 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 206 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 207 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00088 | $0.03626 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00035 | $0.01450 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00725 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00363 |
Grade A, and why
containers scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Use appropriate check commands.** `curl -f` for HTTP services, `pg_isready` for Postgres, `redis-cli ping` for How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 221 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Containers
Security is not optional. Every container runs non-root, with dropped capabilities, on a minimal base image. Convenience defaults that weaken security posture are bugs, not trade-offs.
Security Rules
These are non-negotiable defaults for every container configuration. Apply unconditionally — no exceptions for development, convenience, or "temporary" setups.
- Run as non-root. Add a
USERinstruction with explicit UID/GID. Never run production containers as root. - Drop all capabilities.
--cap-drop=ALL, then add back only what the application genuinely requires. Most applications need zero. - Enable no-new-privileges.
--security-opt=no-new-privilegesprevents setuid/setgid escalation. - Use read-only filesystem.
--read-onlywithtmpfsmounts for/tmp,/run, and any directories the app writes to. - Never pass secrets via ENV. Visible in
docker inspect, logs, and child processes. Use mounted secret files or Docker secrets. - Scan images before deployment. Use Docker Scout, Trivy, or Grype in CI. Block images with critical CVEs.
- Use distroless for production when possible. No shell means no shell-based attacks and dramatically fewer CVEs.
- Never use
--privileged. It removes almost all security restrictions. If a workload claims to need it, decompose the requirement into specific capabilities. - Never mount the Docker socket (
/var/run/docker.sock) into containers. It grants root-equivalent control over the host. Use purpose-built APIs or socket proxies with restricted access. - Use
--initor tini/dumb-init for PID 1. Regular applications don't reap zombie processes or handle signals correctly as PID 1. Usedocker run --init,RunInit=truein Quadlets, or install tini in the Dockerfile. Without this,docker stopwaits for the kill timeout and zombies accumulate. - Verify supply chain integrity. Pin images to digest, generate SBOMs (Syft, Docker Scout), sign images with cosign/Sigstore. Use VEX documents to distinguish exploitable from non-exploitable CVEs. Block unsigned images in CI.
What ships with it
7 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 221 lines · 88 tokens per session scan A 5ba81fdb3c35
containers is a skill published in the GitHub repository xobotyi/cc-foundry (22 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 88 tokens to every session and 3,626 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
deploy-docker-compose
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bdd-container-update
Update the BDD test container image when its dependencies or runtime change. Determines version bump (major vs minor vs patch), rebuilds the Docker image, pushes to GitLab registry, and updates the image tag in starttest.sh. Test source (tests/, features/, scripts/, data/, conftest.py) is bind-mounted from the host…
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.
polar-local-environment
This skill should be used when setting up or managing Polar local development environment with Docker.