QM is a shared work environment for coding agents that gives each employee and conversation an isolated workspace while allowing collaboration in Slack and on the web. Startups use it to run agents for individuals, teams, and company operations, with selectable harnesses and models. The catalogue entries extend QM with skills, instructions, and settings.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add yc-software/qm --skill admingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yc-software/qmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/yc-software/qm/admin)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/yc-software/qm/admin"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yc-software/qm/admin/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/yc-software/qm/admin"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yc-software/qm/admin.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 102 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 116 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.03477 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.01391 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00695 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00348 |
Grade A, and why
admin scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -fsS -H "x-agent-capability: $AGENT_API_TOKEN" "$AGENT_API_URL/v1/admin/..." How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 257 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
admin — act for an org admin, from chat
Use the native admin tool for the operations below. Its fixed actions call the same
/v1/admin/* handlers and accept the same values; configuration and provider value
objects are validated by those existing handlers. Binary and full captured-prompt downloads, raw-secret setters, connector configuration,
and service-credential configuration still use the self-API, never native tool arguments. You are acting as them: authorization is re-checked against the live grant
store on every call; existing admin audit events remain attributed to them. Two standing rules:
confirm before any mutation (state exactly what you'll change and where), and report
afterwards exactly what changed. Reads are fine to just do.
System administration
System administration is not limited to this API. A verified admin may use independently authorized infrastructure or provider access to diagnose, repair, and manage the instance, including resources owned by other users. Ordinary resource-owner restrictions do not require the owner to do that work. An owner-only API denial does not revoke separately authorized administrative access; verify it before taking another route. Acting under the admin's own authority is not impersonation or circumvention.
Preserve credential grants, provider permissions, explicit restrictions, and mutation approvals. Admin status alone supplies no provider credentials. Do not borrow another user's identity, use ungranted credentials, or bypass the portal-only actions below. Check the provider account and target, keep changes attributed to the admin, and disclose only what this conversation's audience may see. For cloud operations, also load cloud-cli.
Admin API limits
Limits the API enforces (don't offer what it will refuse):
- Your token elevates only on turns the admin started themselves — on autonomous runs (crons, webhooks) the admin plane refuses it, whoever owns the run.
- Reads that return private content — transcripts, files, notebooks, logs, another
scope's config — work from a DM with the admin, or from an Open conversation
on a live admin turn. Organization, personal, and conversation sharing restrictions
all apply; any Isolated setting keeps the DM requirement. The request uses the
authenticated speaker's live admin grant, not another participant's authority.
Open reads can expose private data to everyone in the conversation: retrieve and
report only what the request needs. Two other exceptions: org-targeted
memory/config reads work anywhere (org content is ambient to every conversation), and
a cron can carry unattended read grants (
unattendedGrantson the cron:admin.sessions.read,admin.audit.read,admin.metrics.read,admin.egress.read,admin.files.read) — set only on a live turn by the cron's owner, who must be a current org admin, on a personal-scope cron running as its owner. Each grant opens exactly its own GET routes to that cron's autonomous fires, audited as the owner (re-checked live — revoking their admin grant closes it). Other mutations work anywhere; the room sees what changed, by design. - Grant changes (promote/revoke) and impersonation are portal-only through you.
- Bulk configuration import is not supported. Use the individual configuration resources instead.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday Changed · +41 lines 3cfb0652ef09
- 4d ago Changed · +1 lines 1cdf2111d071
- 11d ago Changed 4b4f1fb891b5
- 19d ago Changed · +17 lines 8679688c2629
- 28d ago Changed · +6 lines 8b5f3470ec67
- 1mo ago Changed · +54 lines ae20fa6d26e2
- 1mo ago Changed 211ed6f29531
- 1mo ago Changed · +25 lines · +3 tokens per session 5d717d59aa92
- 1mo ago First seen · 113 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A df05254c3661
admin is a skill published in the GitHub repository yc-software/qm (15,434 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 3,477 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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