cloud-cli

A guide for signing in to a cloud provider's command-line program, such as AWS, Google Cloud, or Azure, and running it as the requesting user.

In plain words
What is it for?
Checking cloud resources, running provider commands, and carrying out cloud changes within the stated safety boundaries.
Why use it?
It checks whether the needed program exists and handles sign-in that may require approving a device code in a browser.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/yc-software/qm/cloud-cli
Any agent
npx skills add yc-software/qm --skill cloud-cli
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yc-software/qm

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 63 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,169 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00063 $0.01169
Opus 5 $0.00032 $0.00584
Sonnet 5 $0.00013 $0.00234
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00117

Measured 2d ago against content hash dd50f1129b42, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

cloud-cli scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills-seed/cloud-cli/SKILL.md · 89 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 89 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Cloud provider CLIs

A resident-machine-auth connector. It adds NO new tool: a provider's CLI is a command on the agent computer and you drive it with the execute primitive. Tokens are cached on the machine across turns. Logins never enter workspace backups; the platform keeps an encrypted copy and restores it if the machine is replaced — if the token is still gone, log in again.

First: is the CLI even here?

Do not assume the binary is on PATH. The sandbox image ships a small, fixed tool set, and the "Your computer" block in your prompt lists what is installed and what is not — read it, or just check:

command -v aws || echo "not installed"

If it is missing, say so and pick a path rather than failing halfway:

  • Install it for this task if the image allows it and the task is worth it — the provider's own installer, into the workspace or $HOME, not a system path. Say that you installed it; it lasts as long as the machine's disk.
  • Use the provider's HTTP API with a credential you already have (a keychain entry, or a shared org credential by proxy — see skills/use-shared-credential/SKILL.md).
  • Ask the operator to add the CLI to the sandbox image if this will recur. That is the durable fix; a per-turn install is not.

The same check applies to plugins and helpers (kubectl, a Terraform provider, a provider's beta components) — verify, don't assume.

Logging in: always the device-code flow

The user approves the login in a browser on their own computer, not on the agent computer. Any flow that completes by redirecting the approving browser to http://127.0.0.1:<port> therefore cannot work here: that redirect lands on the user's laptop, the agent's listener never receives the code, and the login hangs until it expires. Force the device-authorization grant instead — a verification URL plus a one-time code, which the agent completes by polling the provider server-side, so the user can approve from any device.

Provider Login Verify
AWS (IAM Identity Center) aws sso login --use-device-code aws sts get-caller-identity
Google Cloud gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser gcloud auth print-access-token
Azure az login --use-device-code az account show
Another provider its documented device-code / headless flag its "who am I" command

Read the full file on GitHub · 89 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 89 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A dd50f1129b42

Subscribe to this mod's changes

cloud-cli is a skill published in the GitHub repository yc-software/qm (14,360 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 1,169 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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