Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add yzhao062/anywhere-agents --skill implement-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yzhao062/anywhere-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/yzhao062/anywhere-agents/implement-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/yzhao062/anywhere-agents/implement-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yzhao062/anywhere-agents/implement-review.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 14 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 102 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Rogue Agent · line 138 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Prompt Injection · line 139 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Rogue Agent · line 172 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Agent Snooping · line 177 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 196 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Prompt Injection · line 258 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Agent Snooping · line 324 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Prompt Injection · line 341 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 456 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 36 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 293 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 500 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 198 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.27668 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.13834 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.05534 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.02767 |
Grade B, and why
implement-review scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reads agent configuration directoriesmediumAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
`<state-dir>/tail` is a transcript for a human to read. It has no timestamps, and the reviewer's prose can quote the same error strings that appear in real diagnostics. Counting occurrences in a tail therefore does not m Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Invocation**: `claude -p --permission-mode bypassPermissions --tools "Read,Bash,WebSearch,WebFetch" --add-dir <staged-snapshot> --setting-sources project,local --strict-mcp-config --mcp-config <state-dir>/empty-mcp-c How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 585 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implement-Review
Overview
A review loop for staged changes. Claude Code detects the content type, sends the changes to one or more reviewers, categorizes the feedback, revises, and iterates. Codex is the primary reviewer via three channels: terminal relay (manual copy-paste, default on every platform), Auto-terminal (opt-in codex exec subprocess dispatch), or IDE plugin. Other reviewers (Copilot, Gemini, Claude Code, etc.) are driven ad-hoc by the user through their own UI and only need to honor the Review-<AgentName>.md save contract defined in Phase 1c. Cross-vendor exception: when Claude Code is unavailable and Codex (or the user) is the primary implementer, the Auto-terminal channel can dispatch GitHub Copilot CLI as the reviewer through a parallel dispatch-copilot backend (opt-in; see Codex Channels > Auto-terminal Copilot backend). Bare /implement-review auto is unchanged and still selects Codex.
When to plan-review first
Any complex task benefits from a plan review BEFORE execution, not only writing or code. Plan-first catches architectural holes while they are still cheap to fix. The scope includes: system design, refactors, paper outlines, proposal structure, data-pipeline redesigns, multi-stage debugging strategies, teaching / curriculum planning, release-process changes, migration plans, and anything else where the shape of the work precedes and constrains the execution.
Plan-review is a Phase 0 before the staged-change loop below. If the user asks for a plan review, or if the task clearly meets the signals below, do not apply the staged-change prerequisite in Phase 1 yet. Tell the reviewer to read the plan file directly (or paste the plan contents via the terminal path when the reviewer cannot access the file) and critique the design, not git diff --cached. After the plan has no High findings and no new design blockers, execute the work and resume the normal staged-output review flow at Prerequisites / Phase 1.
When to plan-first
What ships with it
22 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- agents/openai.yaml 356 B
- references/example-reviews/example-code-phased.md 4.9 KB
- references/example-reviews/example-paper-multi-target.md 8.9 KB
- references/example-reviews/example-paper-verification.md 3.6 KB
- references/example-reviews/example-proposal-nsf.md 4.0 KB
- references/review-lenses.md 14 KB
- scripts/_claude_guard.ps1 1.1 KB runs code
- scripts/auto-watch.ps1 12 KB runs code
- scripts/auto-watch.sh 12 KB runs code
- scripts/await-review.py 18 KB runs code
- scripts/dispatch-claude.ps1 26 KB runs code
- scripts/dispatch-claude.sh 20 KB runs code
- scripts/dispatch-codex.ps1 30 KB runs code
- scripts/dispatch-codex.sh 22 KB runs code
- scripts/dispatch-copilot.ps1 21 KB runs code
- scripts/dispatch-copilot.sh 16 KB runs code
- scripts/health-check.ps1 4.8 KB runs code
- scripts/health-check.py 34 KB runs code
- scripts/health-check.sh 824 B runs code
- scripts/stall-watch.ps1 13 KB runs code
- scripts/stall-watch.sh 12 KB runs code
- scripts/style-audit.py 19 KB runs code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed 429447df46ba
- 8d ago First seen · 585 lines · 67 tokens per session scan B 80c6da3d8795
implement-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository yzhao062/anywhere-agents (243 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 27,668 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (reads agent configuration directories, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
architecture-review
Agents should invoke this skill for architecture reviews, module boundaries, dependency direction, coupling/cohesion, SOLID concerns, system design trade-offs, layering, service boundaries, or design decisions before implementation.
spec-vs-impl-checker
Agents should invoke this skill when a spec, plan, README, issue, or requirement must be verified against implementation. Traces requirements to code, checks interface contracts, and reports gaps or mismatches.
detecting-typosquatting-packages-in-npm-pypi
Detects typosquatting attacks in npm and PyPI package registries by analyzing package name similarity using Levenshtein distance and other string metrics, examining publish date heuristics to identify recently created packages mimicking established ones, and flagging download count anomalies where suspicious packages…
detecting-dependency-confusion
Detect and prevent public-over-private name resolution in npm, PyPI, and Maven.
detecting-typosquatting-packages
Flag misspelled, brandjacked, and typosquatted package names across npm, PyPI, and crates.io before installation using edit-distance, keyboard-proximity, and known-target corpus matching with typomania, OSSGadget, and pypi-scan.
eslint-config
Composable ESLint flat config for TypeScript projects. Use config() with presets.base spread to activate baseline, javascript, typescript, imports, jsdoc, unicorn, perfectionist, prettier, regexp, command, packagejson, pnpm, gitignore, node, e18e configs. autoEnable detects installed packages (astro, svelte, lit…