Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/zebbern/claude-code-guide/api-fuzzing-bug-bountynpx skills add zebbern/claude-code-guide --skill api-fuzzing-bug-bountygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zebbern/claude-code-guideWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zebbern/claude-code-guide/api-fuzzing-bug-bounty)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zebbern/claude-code-guide/api-fuzzing-bug-bounty"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zebbern/claude-code-guide/api-fuzzing-bug-bounty.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00065 | $0.02751 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.01375 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00550 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00275 |
Grade A, and why
api-fuzzing-bug-bounty scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -X POST https://target.com/graphql \ Copies of this mod
4 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- api-fuzzing-bug-bounty — 94% identical, 7 lines differ
- API Fuzzing for Bug Bounty — 94% identical, 2 lines differ
- API Fuzzing for Bug Bounty — 94% identical, 2 lines differ
- api-fuzzing-bug-bounty — 89% identical, 14 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 434 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
API Fuzzing for Bug Bounty
Purpose
Provide comprehensive techniques for testing REST, SOAP, and GraphQL APIs during bug bounty hunting and penetration testing engagements. Covers vulnerability discovery, authentication bypass, IDOR exploitation, and API-specific attack vectors.
Inputs/Prerequisites
- Burp Suite or similar proxy tool
- API wordlists (SecLists, api_wordlist)
- Understanding of REST/GraphQL/SOAP protocols
- Python for scripting
- Target API endpoints and documentation (if available)
Outputs/Deliverables
- Identified API vulnerabilities
- IDOR exploitation proofs
- Authentication bypass techniques
- SQL injection points
- Unauthorized data access documentation
API Types Overview
| Type | Protocol | Data Format | Structure |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOAP | HTTP | XML | Header + Body |
| REST | HTTP | JSON/XML/URL | Defined endpoints |
| GraphQL | HTTP | Custom Query | Single endpoint |
Core Workflow
Step 1: API Reconnaissance
Identify API type and enumerate endpoints:
# Check for Swagger/OpenAPI documentation
/swagger.json
/openapi.json
/api-docs
/v1/api-docs
/swagger-ui.html
# Use Kiterunner for API discovery
kr scan https://target.com -w routes-large.kite
# Extract paths from Swagger
python3 json2paths.py swagger.json
Step 2: Authentication Testing
# Test different login paths
/api/mobile/login
/api/v3/login
/api/magic_link
/api/admin/login
# Check rate limiting on auth endpoints
# If no rate limit → brute force possible
# Test mobile vs web API separately
# Don't assume same security controls
Step 3: IDOR Testing
Insecure Direct Object Reference is the most common API vulnerability:
# Basic IDOR
GET /api/users/1234 → GET /api/users/1235
# Even if ID is email-based, try numeric
/?user_id=111 instead of /[email protected]
# Test /me/orders vs /user/654321/orders
IDOR Bypass Techniques:
# Wrap ID in array
{"id":111} → {"id":[111]}
# JSON wrap
{"id":111} → {"id":{"id":111}}
# Send ID twice
URL?id=<LEGIT>&id=<VICTIM>
# Wildcard injection
{"user_id":"*"}
# Parameter pollution
/api/get_profile?user_id=<victim>&user_id=<legit>
{"user_id":<legit_id>,"user_id":<victim_id>}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 434 lines · 65 tokens per session scan A b09dbcb762f0
api-fuzzing-bug-bounty is a skill published in the GitHub repository zebbern/claude-code-guide (4,600 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 65 tokens to every session and 2,751 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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