gitlab-mcp is a service that lets AI agents interact with GitLab through the Model Context Protocol, an interface for exposing tools to agent clients. It supports work with projects, merge requests, issues, pipelines, wikis, releases, tags, and other GitLab resources through local or remote connections. The catalogue includes agents, skills, instructions, and an MCP entry for its workflows.
Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to zereight/gitlab-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/main/.github/skills/security-scan/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security-scan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security-scan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 41 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.00914 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00366 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00183 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00091 |
Grade A, and why
security-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
2 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- security-scan — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- security-scan — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 132 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Scan
Rapid security sweep for code changes. Faster than a full /review — focused on security only.
When to Use
- Before committing code that touches auth, user input, data storage, or external APIs
- After adding new dependencies
- Quick pre-PR security gate
Scan Protocol
Step 1: Determine Scope
# Default: scan recent changes
git diff --name-only HEAD~1
# Or use provided path
Step 2: Secrets Scan
# Scan for common secret patterns
grep -rn --include="*.{ts,js,py,go,rs,java,cs,yaml,json,env,sh,toml}" \
-e "sk-[A-Za-z0-9]\{32,\}" \
-e "ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]\{36\}" \
-e "AKIA[0-9A-Z]\{16\}" \
-e "api.key\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]\{8,\}" \
-e "password\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]\{4,\}" \
-e "secret\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]\{8,\}" \
.
# Check .env is in .gitignore
cat .gitignore | grep -E "\.env$|\.env\."
CRITICAL: Any match in committed code = immediate blocker.
Step 3: Dependency Audit
Run language-appropriate audit:
# Node.js
npm audit --audit-level=high
# Python
pip-audit # or: safety check
# Rust
cargo audit
# Go
govulncheck ./...
# Java/Maven
mvn dependency-check:check
Report: Count of critical/high severity CVEs and their package names.
Step 4: Input Validation Spot-Check
For changed files that handle user input (API endpoints, form handlers, CLI args):
- Is input validated/sanitized before use?
- Are SQL queries parameterized (no string concatenation)?
- Is HTML output escaped before rendering?
- Are file paths sanitized (no
../traversal)?
Step 5: Auth/Authz Quick Check
For changed files touching auth:
- Is authentication checked BEFORE authorization?
- Are authorization checks on EVERY relevant endpoint?
- Are JWT tokens validated (algorithm + signature + expiry)?
- Are session cookies
HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict?
Output Format
## Security Scan Report
**Scope:** [files scanned]
**Date:** [timestamp]
### Secrets
- [ ] No hardcoded secrets found
- ⚠ Found: [file:line — description]
### Dependencies
- Critical CVEs: X
- High CVEs: Y
- Packages: [list if any]
### Input Validation
- [ ] User inputs sanitized in changed files
- ⚠ Risk: [file:line — description]
### Auth
- [ ] Auth/authz checks present on relevant routes
- ⚠ Risk: [file:line — description]
### Verdict
CLEAN / NEEDS ATTENTION / BLOCKER
### Next Steps
- [Action items with file:line references]
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 132 lines · 43 tokens per session scan A 46afd2a17329
security-scan is a skill published in the GitHub repository zereight/gitlab-mcp (2,047 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 914 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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