Reverse Skill is a routing package for AI coding agents that selects appropriate reverse-engineering, penetration-testing, and security-research methods and tools for a given target. It is used for tasks involving APKs, binaries, frontend JavaScript, packet captures, CTF challenges, and authorized penetration testing. Its catalogue add-ons provide the skills and instructions that guide these workflows.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill cloud-k8sgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/cloud-k8s)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/cloud-k8s"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/cloud-k8s/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/cloud-k8s"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/cloud-k8s.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket warn
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 18 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.00841 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00420 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00168 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00084 |
Grade B, and why
cloud-k8s scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- 云元数据 SSRF（169.254.169.254 / IMDS） Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
What it actually says
Cloud / Container / Kubernetes Security
ACTION REQUIRED（读完后立刻执行）
NOW: 读取../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md— 云/K8s 测试必须书面授权NOW: case-init + scope；明确账号边界、禁止破坏性操作NOW: 确认是云元数据/容器/K8s/IAM，而非普通 Web 扫（后者pentest-tools/）NEXT: tool-index；kubectl/aws/gcloud 等多为手动安装ACT: 从「身份与暴露面」开始，禁止默认全网扫描
适用场景
- 云元数据 SSRF（169.254.169.254 / IMDS）
- IAM 过度权限、公开存储桶、错误安全组
- Docker/containerd 逃逸路径评估
- Kubernetes RBAC、Secrets、Admission、供应链镜像
- 容器镜像漏洞（可联动
supply-chain-security/）
工作流
Phase 1 — 身份与边界
□ 当前身份：云 AK/SK、K8s SA、节点 SSH？
□ 范围：单账号 / 单 cluster / 单 namespace
□ 网络档：authorized_target_only
Phase 2 — 云控制面
# 示例（按厂商替换；MUST 在授权账号内）
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws s3 ls
# Azure / GCP 对应 identity 命令
□ 公开桶 / 错误 ACL
□ 元数据：IMDSv1 vs v2；SSRF 链
□ 角色可扮演（PassRole）与横向
Phase 3 — 容器
□ 是否 privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork
□ capabilities（SYS_ADMIN 等）
□ 可写宿主机路径 → 逃逸候选
□ 镜像历史与已知 CVE → Trivy
Phase 4 — Kubernetes
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl get pods,secrets,svc -A
kubectl get clusterrolebindings
□ SA token 挂载与权限
□ 危险 admission webhook 缺失
□ etcd / dashboard 暴露
□ 网络策略是否默认放行
工具链
| 工具 | 用途 | 自举 |
|---|---|---|
| kubectl | 集群交互 | 手动 |
| trivy | 镜像/IaC | bootstrap trivy 若可用 |
| kube-bench / kubeaudit | CIS/配置 | 手动 |
| pacu / scoutsuite | 云审计（授权） | 手动 |
| nuclei | 已知云漏洞模板 | bootstrap nmap/nuclei 生态 |
参考
references/k8s-cloud-checklist.md- CTF 对照：
../../CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud/ ../supply-chain-security/../pentest-tools/
路由上下文
上游: MASTER R23
下游: 拿到节点 shell → attack-chain / windows-ad；镜像漏洞 → supply-chain
MUST NOT: 未授权扫公有云其他租户
任务完成自检
- 是否限定在授权账号/cluster？
- 发现是否含复现与影响？
- 是否避免破坏性操作？
- 报告 / journal？
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 100 lines · 35 tokens per session scan B 86fdb2c06275
cloud-k8s is a skill published in the GitHub repository zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill (35,183 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 841 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
azd-deployment
Deploy containerized frontend + backend applications to Azure Container Apps with remote builds, managed identity, and idempotent infrastructure.
openshell-cli
Guide agents through using the OpenShell CLI (openshell) for sandbox management, gateway registration, provider configuration and refresh, policy iteration, settings, service exposure, BYOC workflows, and inference routing. Covers basic through advanced multi-step workflows. Trigger keywords - openshell, sandbox…
langbot-deploy
Deploy and configure a LangBot instance — Docker / Docker Compose, Kubernetes, the config.yaml model, the Box sandbox runtime, the plugin runtime, and the global API key. Use when installing, deploying, upgrading, or configuring LangBot in production or self-hosted environments. Triggers on "deploy langbot", "langbot…
compute-env-setup
Set up a compute environment on a remote provider so Claude Science jobs can run there. Covers direct SSH/conda hosts, Slurm clusters, container-via-bridge runners, and managed-API providers (Modal, GCP, RunPod). Use when standing up a new provider, porting an env to a different backend, adding a tool that needs its…
azure-cloud-migrate
Assess and migrate cross-cloud workloads to Azure with reports and code conversion. Supports Lambda→Functions, Beanstalk/Heroku/App Engine→App Service, Fargate/Kubernetes/Cloud Run/Spring Boot→Container Apps. WHEN: migrate Lambda to Functions, AWS to Azure, migrate Beanstalk, migrate Heroku, migrate App Engine, Cloud…
atmos-helmfile
Helmfile orchestration: sync/apply/destroy/diff, Kubernetes deployments, varfile generation, EKS integration, source management.