Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to zkysar1/Claude-Mind. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zkysar1/Claude-Mind/main/.claude/skills/aspirations/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zkysar1/Claude-MindWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 50 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 159 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00101 | $0.14383 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00051 | $0.07192 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.02877 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.01438 |
Grade A, and why
aspirations scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 900 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/aspirations — Perpetual Goal Loop Engine (Slim Orchestrator)
The heartbeat of the continual learning agent. Delegates ALL phase work to sub-skills
that load on-demand and fall out of context at compaction. The orchestrator stays as thin
as possible — phase bodies belong in sub-skills, not here — to minimize re-entry cost after
autocompact. (Further idle-path cost savings live in core/scripts/idle-tick.sh, which
short-circuits the turn before this file is even loaded when blocked_sleep_until is set.)
Step 0: Load Conventions — Bash: load-conventions.sh with each name from the conventions: front matter.
Step 0.5: Sub-Command Dispatch — Only the loop sub-command runs the
perpetual body below. For any other sub-command (status, next, evolve,
complete, add), the body below is cold weight. Gate it:
IF args is set AND args != 'loop':
Read core/config/aspirations-subcommands-digest.md
Follow the section matching <args>. RETURN.
# ELSE: args == 'loop' or unset → continue to the perpetual body.
Core Principle: No Terminal State
The system ALWAYS has work to do. If it doesn't, it creates work. Completion of one thing seeds the next thing.
The loop never exits, but the loop's work may be observation rather than
generation. When the queue is structurally user-gated (every blocked goal
carries a valid blocker_ref), the quiescence gate
(core/scripts/quiescence-gate.py) may approve a longer sleep instead of
forcing B3/B4/B5 work generation every all-blocked cycle. See
core/config/modes/autonomous.md → "Core Design Principle: No Terminal State"
for the full doctrine and core/config/conventions/goal-schemas.md →
"Blocker Reference Schema" for the structural requirement that prevents
narrative-laundering into quiescence.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed · +15 lines fead84a4a634
- 6d ago Changed · +11 lines 9902b78233b3
- 10d ago First seen · 874 lines · 101 tokens per session scan A 9abad3fcff8d
aspirations is a skill published in the GitHub repository zkysar1/Claude-Mind (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 101 tokens to every session and 14,383 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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