Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to zkysar1/Claude-Mind. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zkysar1/Claude-Mind/main/.claude/skills/aspirations-graceful-stop/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zkysar1/Claude-MindWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-graceful-stop)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-graceful-stop"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-graceful-stop/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-graceful-stop"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-graceful-stop.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 166 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 216 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 357 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 501 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 501 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 524 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 310 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 536 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00107 | $0.09541 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00053 | $0.04770 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00021 | $0.01908 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00954 |
Grade A, and why
aspirations-graceful-stop scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 550 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/aspirations-graceful-stop — Graceful Stop Handler
Detects stop-requested signal (set by /stop) and completes in-flight obligations
before running the full stop sequence. This ensures no learning is lost.
Invocation contract. The caller (aspirations orchestrator Phase -1.4) has already
verified session-signal-exists.sh stop-requested returned exit 0. This skill MUST
end its execution by returning control to the harness (not to the orchestrator) —
after the deferred stop sequence completes, state is IDLE and mode has been updated,
so the orchestrator's iteration loop MUST NOT continue.
Mode invariant. This skill runs at the RUNNING→IDLE transition. D1 sets IDLE,
D7 sets the target mode. The minimum_mode: autonomous front matter is evaluated
at invocation time (before D1 runs), so the skill retains autonomous capabilities
through D7 even though agent-state changes mid-skill.
Resume mode (--resume, FW-11 / g-317-09). Autocompact can interrupt this
handler mid-sequence — most often during the long D4 consolidate. Because D1
flips agent-state to IDLE early, the aspirations loop then bails at its Phase
-1.5 state gate and never re-enters Phase -1.4 to re-detect stop-requested
(which D3 also clears), so the half-finished stop strands: consolidation/handoff
incomplete, agent-mode stuck at autonomous, loop_state lingering. To make this
recoverable, GS-0 writes a persistent stop-checkpoint.json sentinel that is
cleared ONLY at clean completion (D7.1). Its presence is the detection signal:
the Session Start Protocol (CLAUDE.md, IDLE branch) probes
stop-checkpoint.sh resume-needed and, on a hit, invokes
/aspirations-graceful-stop --resume. The --resume path is identical to the
fresh path (GS-0 → GS-2) — every D-phase is idempotent (set-IDLE, clear-signal,
consolidation-precheck FAST-when-done, rm -f, set-mode), so re-running the
whole sequence is safe and correct. The only differences on --resume: (1) the
caller has NOT verified stop-requested (the checkpoint is the trigger instead),
and (2) GS-0 prefers the checkpoint's cached target_mode because D7 may have
already deleted stop-target-mode before the interruption. A resume-count
breaker (cap 3, in stop_checkpoint.py) stops auto-resuming a persistently
failing stop and surfaces it for manual intervention.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago Changed · -7 lines 41ca781c0203
- 12d ago First seen · 557 lines · 107 tokens per session scan A cc2233226716
aspirations-graceful-stop is a skill published in the GitHub repository zkysar1/Claude-Mind (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 107 tokens to every session and 9,541 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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